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LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND KOREA’S FINANCIAL 
SERVICES MARKET: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 
Young-Cheol Jeong† 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to improve the compliance level in the 
Korean financial services market by proposing a more systematic approach to economic 
crimes.  As one of the most important capital markets in Asia, the Korean financial 
services market has weathered well both the hardship of the Asian financial crisis and the 
challenges of the Great Recession.  Thus, its policy directions and experience are 
valuable to other burgeoning capital markets around the world.  This paper contributes to 
a better understanding of the compliance system in the Korean financial services market.  
Based on a literature review, this paper analyzes the three groups of counter-measures—
criminal sanctions, administrative sanctions, and civil remedies.  Currently, criminal 
sanctions on individuals are overly relied upon; administrative sanctions on corporate 
entities have become increasingly important; civil remedies by the damaged are not 
effective; and preventive efforts have been disregarded.  The ultimate goal of regulations 
is to let regulated entities comply with legal requirements.  With respect to crimes in the 
financial services market, educational and compliance programs should be implemented 
as important built-in enforcement tools.  Enforcement mechanisms should encompass 
preventive and educational efforts.  Further, redesigning new compliance structures based 
on education will free market players from fastidious regulatory policies and 
discretionary criminal indictment, and improve the trust in the financial system with 
minimal social costs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 1, 2010, the International Monetary Fund Executive 
Board, in its Article IV Consultation-Staff Report, observed that the South 
Korean (“Korean”) economy has had impressive success over the past year.1  
The real GDP for 2009 was KRW 1,063 trillion, equalling about U.S. $1 
trillion.2  The Board also projected 6.1% growth in 2010.3  Korea’s trade 
volume is expected to reach $1 trillion in 2011,4 after reaching an expected 
                                           
†
 Professor of Law, Yonsei Law School.  Member of Korea, Illinois, and District of Columbia Bars.  
Seoul National University College of Law, LL.B. 1978, LL.M. 1982.  Columbia Law School, LL.M. 1984, 
J.D. 1986.  I truly appreciate the insightful comments and legitimate questions regarding this articles’s draft 
that were raised by an anonymous reviewer.  
1 
 See generally INT’L MONETARY FUND (“IMF”), COUNTRY REPORT NO. 10/270 (Sept. 2010), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10270.pdf. 
2
  Id. at 24. 
3
  Id. at 7. 
4
  Korea’s exports are expected to increase by an estimated 10.3% in 2011, reaching $513 billion, 
while imports are expected to surge by 15.1% to $488 billion.  KOREAN MINISTRY OF KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY, 2011 BUSINESS PLAN, available at 
http://www.mke.go.kr/news/bodo/bodoView.jsp?seq=65436&pageNo=3&srchType=1&srchWord=&pCtx
=1. 
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$891.59 billion in 2010.5  Within the financial services market,6 the market 
capitalization at Korea Exchange (“KRX”) in 2009 was $834.5 billion.7  The 
amount of listed bonds as of 2009 was KRW 1,013 trillion.8  The total of 
bank loans to corporate customers and individuals was KRW 719 trillion and 
KRW 595 trillion, respectively, as of the end of 2010.9  Considering the 
global recession that started in 2007 is still lingering in Europe and the 
United States, the Korean economy’s recovery is “impressive.”10  Table 1 
shows the market capitalization of major exchanges in the world. 
 
[TABLE 1]  MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF MAJOR EXCHANGES (2009) 
Exchanges Unit: U.S. $1,000 
NYSE Euronext  11,837,793 
NASDAQ OMX   3,239,492 
Shanghai SE + Shenzhen SE   2,704,778 + 868,374 = 3,573,152 
Tokyo SE Group + Osaka SE + Jasdaq   3,306,082 + 138,329 + 89,567 = 3,533,978 
Singapore      481,267 
KRX      834,596a 
HK   2,305,142 
Bombay SE   1,306,520 
a) KRX had exceeded $1 trillion by the end of 2010, due to the sound 
economy, qualitative easing, and KRW appreciation. 11 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
 
In contrast to the successful economic performance, the Korean 
business community has been in a vicious cycle of ad hoc criminal and 
administrative investigations, sanctions, and pardons.12   In 2010, several 
                                           
5
  Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 33:2 Monthly Economic Bulletin 16 (Feb. 2011), 
available at http://english.mosf.go.kr/. 
6
  The term “financial services market” includes the insurance industry in most cases.  However, it 
sometimes refers to only banking and capital market industries, depending on the context. 
7
  Market Statistics—2008-2009 Domestic Market Capitalization, WORLD FEDERATION OF 
EXCHANGES, http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2009/equity-markets/domestic-market-
capitalization (download “EQUITY109.xls”) (last visited May 13, 2011). 
8
  Id.  Public and private bonds were KRW 759 trillion and KRW 254 trillion, respectively.  Id. 
9
  Economic Statistics System, BANK OF KOREA, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).  
10
  IMF, supra note 1, at 3; see also Jong-Goo Yi, Commissioner, Fin. Service Comm’n (“FSC”), 
Presentation at Korea-FSB Reform Conference: Korea’s Experience and Policy Responses to Global 
Financial Crisis, (Sept. 3, 2010). 
11
  The amount of market capitalization was KRW 1.239 trillion.  Review of 2010 Statistics, KOREA 
EXCHANGE (“KRX”),  http://eng.krx.co.kr/m8/m8_5/m8_5_1/BHPENG08005_01_01.jsp (last visited Apr. 
27, 2011). 
12
  This vicious cycle, however, is not limited to Korea.  Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of 
Crime, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1272, 1280 (1991) (“An individual has a higher current propensity for crime if 
fewer resources were spent on the criminal apprehension system during a past period of his active life.  
Fewer resources dilute the resources spent on apprehending each criminal.”).  See generally MARTIN T. 
BIEGELMAN & JOEL T. BARTOW, PREVENTION AND INTERNAL CONTROL (2006). 
JUNE 2011 KOREA FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKET 485 
  
conglomerates came under investigation for the crimes of embezzlement or 
breach of fiduciary duty, leading to the prosecution of several executives 
from major Korean corporations.13  On August 13, 2010, a group of business 
leaders were pardoned, including those whose sentences were finalized less 
than a year before. 14   These cases demonstrate prevalent financial 
misconduct in Korea, as well as a disregard for legal compliance by top 
management.  The rule of law in Korea, as far as the business world is 
concerned, has a long way to catch up to be on par with the economic 
performance.  The gap between the economic performance and the legal 
quagmire demonstrates the urgent need to develop a more effective 
enforcement mechanism.  It is indeed one of many challenges that Korean 
lawyers, along with other parts of Korean society, should seek to overcome.   
Korea relies heavily on criminal sanctions in regulating financial 
markets.15  The Public Prosecutor’s Office has long been one of the business 
                                           
13
  See, e.g., Criminal Probe into ex-Shinhan Bank Pres. Begins, DONGA ILBO, Sept. 4, 2010, 
http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=020000&biid=2010090451578 (“Seoul prosecutors 
began an investigation Friday into allegations of embezzlement and breach of duty against Shinhan 
Financial Group President Shin Sang-hoon.  Shinhan Bank filed a criminal complaint against Shin, saying 
he illegally provided huge loans to companies in poor financial health while serving as the bank’s 
president.”); Local Firms on U.S. Fine List, JOONGANG DAILY, Jun. 11, 2010 (listing the ten multinational 
corporations that paid the largest antitrust fines to the United States between 1999 and 2010; the four 
Korean companies included—LG Display Co., Korean Air, Samsung Electronics Co. and Hynix 
Semiconductor, Inc.—paid a combined KRW 1.6 trillion [$1.28 billion]); see also Yoon Bae Park, The 
Corporate Governance Fix for Korea, WALL STREET J., Feb. 22, 2011, at 11.  
14
  See, e.g., Policy News, KOREAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Aug. 13, 2010.  Five Samsung executives 
were sentenced in 2009 for managing slush funds and avoiding tax.  Id.  The chairman was pardoned at the 
2009 year-end pardon exercise.  Id.  Operators of more than KRW 4.5 trillion slush funds were cleared 
within three years from the date of investigation by special prosecutors.  Id.  Samsung Securities, which 
was a conduit of operating the funds, was just warned.  Id.  Samsung Life Ins. executives who destroyed 
evidence were released.  Id.  This might be a necessity to balance the need to maintain the rule of law 
against the wider public interest, such as that of the national economy.   
15
  See infra Table 4.  Over-criminalization in the United States has also been the subject of criticism.  
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.L. REV. 193 (1991) (“[B]lurring of the border between 
tort and crime predictably will result in injustice.”); Steven Williams, The More Law, the Less Rule of Law, 
2 GREEN BAG 2D 403, 405 (1999) (“As the commands of the state multiply, there is a corresponding 
decline in the fraction of those commands that people can be expected to comply with.”); William J. Stuntz, 
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, (2001) (“[C]riminal law does not drive 
criminal punishment . . . .  [T]he role [the definition of crimes and defenses] plays is to empower 
prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175-917 
(2004) (arguing deterrence does not work because of the legal knowledge hurdle, the rational choice hurdle, 
and the perceived net cost hurdle).  Sentence severity may have a limited effect on compliance.  See 
generally Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Maire Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null 
Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 145 (2003) (“[T]he deterrent impact of penalty size has been seriously 
challenged by modern criminology.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review: 
The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2002) (“[P]eople often neglect probabilities [and] focus 
on worst case outcomes.”).  
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sector’s most feared agencies (along with the National Tax Administration 
and the Board of Audit and Inspection), although now to a lesser degree than 
in the past.  Almost every instance of misconduct in the financial market 
automatically leads to criminal sanctions, at least according to statute.16  The 
basic regulatory theory and principle in Korea appears to be that more severe 
penalties will naturally reduce crimes.17  Criminal sanctions, traditionally 
regarded as the most forceful sanctions an individual can face, are an attempt 
to ensure compliance founded on fear;18 individuals fear going to prison 
when they violate the law.  Administrative sanctions, especially civil fines, 
are another method grounded on fear.  Corporate entities are loath to part 
with their hard-earned economic gains when they breach legal 
requirements.19  Sanctions, however, are more effective for retributive justice 
rather than for preventive justice.20  Additionally, sanctions are not effective 
in handling all crimes, and their use likely leads to under-enforcement.21  As 
the Korean financial services sector expands in size and geography and 
becomes more complicated and specialized, criminal and administrative 
sanctions tend to be less effective at curbing misconduct in the market.  As 
the number of cases and complaints increases, 22  the current Korean 
regulation system is at risk of severe under-enforcement.  In turn, this could 
erode civic norms of obedience.23   
This article argues that in order to avoid such an undesirable situation, 
Korea should strengthen its preventive regulatory system.  To combat 
                                           
16
  See Jabonshijanggwa gwemyungtoojae gwanhan bup [Capital Markets and Financial Investment 
Business Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007 amended by Act No. 10366, Jun. 11, 2012, arts. 443-46 
[hereinafter Capital Markets Act]; Eunhangbup [Banking Act], Act No. 5499, Jan. 31, 1998, amended by 
Act No. 10303, Nov. 18. 2010, arts. 66-68 [hereinafter Banking Act]; see also infra Table 2. 
17
 Responses to the recent savings bank crisis exhibit the same severe penalties.  See Press Release, 
Financial Services Board, Stricter Supervision of Savings Bank (Mar. 17, 2011); Se Young Lee, South 
Korea fights fire among its savings bank, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18-20, 2011, at 20; Se Young Lee, South Korea 
suspends 4 more savings banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2011, at 20; Se Young Lee, Korea will stiffen bank 
supervision, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2011, at 21. 
18
  JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, Ch. I (1789). 
19
  Some attorneys criticize the utilitarian view.  See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social 
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 350 (1997) (“The phenomena of social influence and social 
meaning matter for deterrence.”); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL EDU. 661, 662-
63 (1998) (positing law, social norms, market, and architecture are four types of constraints on behaviors). 
20
  See supra note 15 (discussing the inefficacy of criminal punishment as a deterrent). 
21
  See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Law and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 N.W. U. L. 
REV. 655, 658, 667-70 (2006).  
22
  See Chun-Hyun Lee, Phenomena of Economic Crimes: Changes, Reality and Characteristics, 19 
CRIM. POL’Y 173 (2007).  Monthly and yearly crime statistics are available at the Supreme Prosecutor’s 
Office website at www.spo.go.kr. 
23
  See Cheng, supra note 21, at 659-61.  Additional problems associated with retributive sanctions 
include a substantial risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, harm to the authority of the law, and 
degradation of law enforcement into a sporting chance.  Id. 
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economic crimes,24 future enforcement efforts should focus on a forward-
looking perspective—systematic and strategic preventive mechanisms and 
incentivized rewards, accompanied by reasonably certain and severe 
penalties.  Sanctions and preventive measures are not sequential, however.  
Instead, they should co-exist.  They are not a matter of choice or 
replacement, but a matter of focus and perspective. 
This article is an attempt to improve compliance by introducing 
preventive mechanisms to the enforcement structure of financial services 
market crimes in Korea, thereby re-establishing the authority of the law.  
This is an essential and necessary step before Korea is truly ruled by law and 
thus establishes itself as a financially advanced country.  Part II reviews the 
regulatory structure of the financial services market in Korea.  Part III 
explores the status of ex post facto counter-measures for economic crimes.  
It will show that criminal sanctions are the traditional answer to crimes in 
Korea.  Administrative sanctions, including civil fines, are the second most 
popular response, and civil actions for compensation of damages are just 
emerging.  Part IV provides an overview of ex ante mechanisms under 
current Korean laws.  Although they appear ineffective and even 
perfunctory, some preventive control mechanisms are in place in several 
statutes.  Finally, Part V presents proposals to make these existing 
mechanisms more effective.  First, preventive measures should become the 
favored means of improving these mechanisms.  Courts should consider a 
company’s preventive efforts as mitigating factors when a breach occurs.  
Education, which has driven economic development in Korea for the past 
several decades, should also be a major part of prevention-based 
enforcement.  Second, the rules themselves must be clear and limit 
discretionary enforcement.25  Various sanctions should be coordinated to the 
effect that law enforcement is not left to chance.  Finally, in striking a 
                                           
24
  The term “economic crime” in Korea is broader than white-collar crime or corporate crime in 
other jurisdictions.  See JUDICIAL RESEARCH TRAINING AND INSTITUTE, DISCUSSION ON ECONOMIC CRIMES 
3-10 (2009).  According to most public prosecutors, “economic crime” also covers customs duty violations 
and intellectual property rights infringement crimes.  Id.  It is characterized as profit-motivated, imitative, 
and corrupt.  Id.  Some use the term “financial crimes” and they are classified into four groups: corruption, 
fraud, theft, and manipulation.  See Petter Gottschalk, Categories of Financial Crime, 17 J. FIN. CRIME 441, 
443 (2010).  Each category has subsets of crimes.  Id.  Corruption, for example, includes kickbacks, 
bribery, extortion, and embezzlement. Id.  This article uses the terms “financial crime,” “economic crime,” 
and “crime in the financial market” interchangeably.  
25
  See Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two 
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 865, 865 (2008) 
(“In addition to sanctions and legitimacy, law can also influence compliance simply by making one 
outcome salient.”). 
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balance between public and private and between criminal and administrative, 
enforcement mechanisms should move towards the latter in both cases.  
II. REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKETS 
Part II provides an overview of the Korean laws applicable to 
financial sectors.  While financial services are in the process of convergence, 
the regulatory legal scheme is still compartmentalized because three 
different statutes regulate banking, capital markets, and insurance.  On the 
regulatory agency level, the Financial Services Commission covers financial 
services in general and establishes regulatory policies.  The Financial 
Supervisory Services then implements the policies across the board.   
A. Applicable Laws 
The Banking Act,26  the Financial Investment Services and Capital 
Markets Act (“Capital Markets Act”),27 and the Insurance Business Act28  
(collectively, “the tripartite statutes”) are three pillars that support the 
financial services market.  Aside from the tripartite statutes, separate statutes 
govern special banks, such as the Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank 
of Korea, and Korea EXIM Bank. 29   Mutual savings banks and capital 
companies for both consumers and small-to-medium enterprises are 
governed by the Mutual Savings Banks Act and the Special Credit Financial 
Business Act.30   
For the past decade, the Banking Act and the Insurance Business Act 
have undergone frequent amendments—five times for the Banking Act31 and 
                                           
26
  Banking Act, supra note 16.  
27
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16.  The Capital Markets Act entered into effect on Feb. 4, 2009, 
one year and six months after its adoption into law on Aug. 3, 2007. 
28
  Bohumupbup [Insurance Business Act], Act No. 6891, May 29 2003, amended by Act No. 10394, 
Jan. 14, 2011 [hereinafter Insurance Business Act].  Insurance contracts are regulated by Book 5 of the 
Korean Commercial Code.  Welfare insurance, such as employment, health care, or occupational injury 
compensation, is covered by independent statutes. 
29
  Hangugsan eob eunhaeng [Korea Development Bank Act], Act No. 302, Dec. 30, 1953, amended 
by Act No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010; Jungsokieeop eunhaeng [Industrial Bank of Korea Act], Act No. 641, Jul. 
1, 1961 amended by Act No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010; Hangug soochulip eunhaeng [Korea EXIM Bank Act], 
Act No. 2122, Jul. 1, 1961, amended by Act No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010.  While the Industrial Bank of Korea 
(“IBK”) is listed on KRX, an IPO of the Korea Development Bank (“KDB”) is under consideration.  KDB, 
as a holding company, owns Korea Finance Corporation, Daewoo Securities, KDB Capital, and KDB Asset 
Management. 
30
  Sanghojuchuoeunhanbup [Mutual Savings Banks Act], Act No. 2333, amended by Act No. 10303, 
No. 18, 2010; YeoshinjunmoonKeumyungupbup [Special Credit Financial Business Act], Act No. 5374, 
amended by Act No. 10062, Jun. 13, 2010. 
31
 Banking Act, supra note 16.  See Act No. 10303, amended May 17, 2010, effective Nov. 18, 2010; 
Act No. 9784, amended Jun. 9, 2009, effective Oct. 10, 2009; Act No. 8906, amended and effective Mar. 
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six times for the Insurance Business Act. 32   Most changes were not 
motivated by a concern for specific financial crimes or misconduct.  Instead, 
two other factors drove the amendments.  First, they were the result of a 
general industry trend from government-dominated, implicit, bureaucratic 
regulations toward privatized, lucid regulations for investors.  Second, they 
were driven by an aim to protect the interest of investors and creditors by 
reducing the possibility of major shareholders privatizing controlling 
interests.  For example, the most recent amendment to the Banking Act 
liberalized the scope of the banking business sector and improved the 
corporate governance structure.33  The most recent change to the Insurance 
Business Act increased protection of insurance consumers by imposing a 
duty to explain and by making corporate governance more transparent.34  
 The enforcement of the Capital Markets Act in 2009 resulted in 
sweeping changes because it consolidated six investment banking business-
related laws: the Securities and Exchanges Act, Futures Trading Act, Asset 
Management Business Act, Trust Business Act, Merchant Banking Business 
Law, and Korea Securities and Futures Exchange Act.  Before the Capital 
Markets Act, the six laws regulated different segments of the financial 
industry with the same function—overseeing business licenses.35  Thus, the 
Capital Markets Act was a game changer, moving Korea’s institutional 
regulatory framework to a functional regulatory framework.36 
The Capital Markets Act also delegated much of its rule-making and 
enforcement functions to self-regulating organizations such as the Korean 
Exchange (“KRX”) and the Korean Financial Investment Association 
(“KOFIA”).  For example, KRX has the authority to establish 
listing/disclosure standards and trading/settlement rules at the KRX 
exchange,37 while KOFIA approves over-the-counter derivative products.38  
Accordingly, KRX and KOFIA have established many regulations on capital 
markets. 
                                                                                                                              
14, 2008; Act No. 6691 amended Apr. 27, 2002, effective Jul. 28, 2002; and Act No. 6177 amended on Jan. 
21, 2000, effective Apr. 22, 2000.  
32
 Insurance Business Act, supra note 28.  See Act No. 10394, amended Jul. 23, 2010, effective Jan. 
24, 2011; Act No. 8902, amended Mar. 14, 2008, effective Jun. 15, 2008; Act No. 8520, amended Jul. 19, 
2007, effective Jan. 20, 2008; Act No. 8386 amended and effective Apr. 27, 2007; Act No. 7971 amended 
and effective Aug. 29, 2006; Act No. 6891 amended on May 29, 2003, effective Aug. 20, 2003. 
33
  Banking Act, supra note 16.   
34
  Insurance Business Act, supra note 28.   
35
  Consolidation is still on its way in the sense that banking and insurance are still separately 
regulated by different statutes.  
36
  See KOREA MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, REASON FOR NEW ENACTMENT, available 
at http://www.law.go.kr. 
37
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 373-414. 
38
  Id. arts. 283-93. 
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B. Regulatory Agencies 
The legal structure employs three different statutes to govern financial 
intermediaries such as the merchant banking, investment banking, and 
insurance industries.  In contrast, all financial services are regulated by one 
centralized agency.39  In other words, although institutional fragmentation 
still exists among these financial intermediaries, the regulatory organizations 
governing them were completely unified immediately after the 1997 
financial crisis into one agency—the Financial Services Commission. 
The Financial Services Commission was launched as the policy 
development agency, taking over the role of the Ministry of Finance. 40  
Based on authorization from the Banking Act, the Capital Markets Act, and 
the Insurance Business Act, the Financial Services Commission establishes 
policies regarding financial markets in general. 41   Meanwhile, Financial 
Supervisory Services, a private entity, became the implementation arm under 
the Financial Services Commission. 42   It primarily handles enforcement 
functions, although not exclusively. 43   The Securities and Futures 
Commission, under the Financial Services Commission, maintains the 
primary authority to make decisions on administrative sanctions for certain 
breaches under the Capital Markets Act. 44   KRX and KOFIA, as self-
regulating organizations, have the authority to monitor and sanction their 
members.45 
C. Investigation 
When violations of the tripartite statutes occur, a prosecutor may 
initiate an investigation if he or she reasonably believes that such 
investigation would lead to successful criminal prosecution under the 
                                           
39
  Keumyungweewonhoeei sulchi deunge gwanhan beopyul [Act on the Establishment, Etc., of 
Financial Services Commission], Act No. 5490, Dec. 31, 1997, amended by Act No. 10303, May 17, 2010, 
art. 17 [hereinafter Financial Services Commission Act].   
40
  KOREA MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 36. 
41
  The rules and procedures of the Financial Services Commission are available at 
http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/. 
42
  Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, arts. 24-50. 
43
  Id. 
44
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 439.  The Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) 
regulates unfair trading activities, which include insider trading, the 5% rule, major shareholder reporting, 
short-term windfall profits, failure to file periodic disclosure documents, the filing of false registration 
statements, and price manipulation.  Id. arts. 172-74, 176, 178, 180, 427. 
45
  KOREA SECURITIES LAWYERS ASSOCIATION (“KSLA”), A STUDY ON REGULATORY SYSTEM 
UNDER THE CAPITAL MARKETS ACT 172-78 (2006). 
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Korean Criminal Procedural Act. 46  In practice, however, market regulators 
have the responsibility and power to monitor the market. 47   Thus, in 
instances of abnormalities in trading,48 the KRX has the primary authority to 
request that the financial investment licensee produce relevant materials, or 
to audit the status of the assets, books, and other materials of its members.49  
The Financial Services Commission may also request that KRX or the 
Financial Supervisory Services use the audit process and file a report.50  For 
banks and insurance companies, the Financial Services Commission can ask 
the Financial Supervisory Services to audit the questionable practices.51  
An agency may only initiate an investigation after establishing that it 
possesses the proper authority to do so.  The Financial Services Commission 
may launch its own investigation procedure by requesting that a relevant 
party submit an affidavit, take the witness stand, or produce documents.52  If 
the Securities and Futures Commission wishes to investigate unfair trade 
practices,53 it may secure a search warrant from the court for such exercise.54  
In the case of the most serious violations, 55  the Financial Services 
Commission files a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
for indictment. 56  The Public Prosecutor’s Office can also investigate the 
KRX, the Financial Supervisory Services, and other self-regulating 
organizations with the assistance of experts from these organizations.57  
                                           
46
  Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Act], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, amended by Act 
No. 8730, Dec. 21, 2007, art. 195. 
47
  See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 426-27. 
48
  See id. art. 355; Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets 
Act, Presidential Decree No. 20947, Jul. 29, 2008, amended by Presidential Decree No. 21291, Feb. 3, 
2009, art. 355 (Korean Financial Investment Association trans. 2009) [hereinafter Capital Markets Act 
E.D.] (defining abnormal trading).  
49
  Id. art. 404. KRX is required to institute Market Monitoring Comm. pursuant to Art. 403 of the 
Capital Markets Act.  For discussion on the actual practice of investigation, see In-Bong Jang, Practical 
Matters and Issues Relating to Finding Illegality in Unfair Transactions of Securities, 8 K. J. SEC. L. 213, 
218-20 (2007).   
50
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 410. 
51
  See id. art. 426(1). 
52
  See id. art. 426(2).   
53
  See id. arts. 172-74, 176, 178, 180. 
54
  See id. art. 427.   
55
  See, e.g. Se Young Lee & Alison Tudor, South Korea Sanctions Deutsche Unit for Market 
Manipulation, WALL ST. J.; see also Press Release, Financial Services Commission, Price Drop on Option 
Expiration Date (Feb. 23, 2011). 
56
  According to the Financial Supervisory Service (“FSS”), predominant cases were transferred to 
the public prosecutor’s office.  See FSS, 2009 YEARBOOK, Table 2-18 (2010).  In the case of unfair trading, 
more than 80% of cases ended up with a criminal indictment.  Id. at 69.  
57
  Judicial Research and Training Institute, supra note 24, at 216-17. 
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III. EX POST FACTO MEASURES 
Part III explores the types and scopes of legal sanctions imposed when 
violations occur.  Depending on the legal nature of the initiating entity, legal 
sanctions may be public or private.  Public sanctions comprise two types of 
sanctions: criminal and administrative.  Criminal sanctions commence when 
the prosecutory organization issues a criminal indictment and end when the 
court imposes a sentence.  By contrast, administrative sanctions commence 
and end at the initiative of administrative agencies, such as the Financial 
Services Commission.  If the violator wants to challenge the administrative 
sanctions, he or she can file a complaint with the court and seek revocation 
of such administrative measures.  Alternatively, private individuals may sue 
in court for damages in accordance with the court’s procedural rules. 
A. Criminal Sanctions 
Criminal sanctions are the most severe form of legal sanctions.  What 
conduct constitutes a crime and who is punishable are important policy 
issues.  The process of criminalization is particularly significant. 
1. Strata of Criminal Conduct 
The tripartite statutes—the Banking Act, the Capital Markets Act, and 
the Insurance Business Act—take the typical structure of a statute in Korea; 
the last chapter of each statute is about penalties.  In the case of the Banking 
Act, criminal conduct is subject to four tiers of sanctions: group one for up 
to ten years imprisonment or a fine of KRW 500 million;58 group two for up 
to five years of imprisonment or a fine of KRW 200 million;59 group three 
for up to three years of imprisonment or a fine of KRW 100 million;60 and 
group four for up to one year of imprisonment or a fine of KRW 30 
million.61  The Capital Markets Act adopts the same four-tiered system: 
imprisonment of ten, five, three and one year(s); and a fine of KRW 500, 
200, 100, and 30 million, respectively (see Table 2). 62   The Insurance 
Business Act mandates a five-tier system: imprisonment of ten, seven, five, 
three and one years.63  The corresponding fines are lower than under the 
Banking Act and the Capital Markets Act: KRW 50, 40, 30, 20, and 10 
                                           
58
  Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 66(1). 
59
  Id. art. 66(2). 
60
  Id. art. 67. 
61
  Id. art. 68(1).  
62
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 443-46.   
63
  Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, arts. 197-204. 
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million, respectively (see Table 3).  It is not clear why the fines under the 
Insurance Business Act are lower than those under the Banking Act or the 
Capital Markets Act.  It may be because the Banking Act and Capital 
Markets Act were revised recently, increasing the amount of fines, while the 
Insurance Business Act’s fines simply have not been correspondingly 
revised.64  The Banking Act and the Capital Markets Act are often subject to 
discussions for revisions, while the Insurance Business Act has received less 
criticism. 
 
[TABLE 2]  CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND SANCTIONS UNDER THE 
BANKING ACT & CAPITAL MARKETS ACT 
Tier Sanctions (in 
years/KRW million) 
Statutory Provisions (Number of categories of criminal 
conduct) 
  Banking Act Capital Markets Act 
Tier 1  10 years/KRW 500 Art. 66(1) (four) Art. 443a (nine) 
Tier 2  5 years/ KRW 200 Art. 66(2) (one) Art. 444 (twenty-nine) 
Tier 3  3 years/KRW 100 Art. 67 (two) Art. 445 (forty-eight) 
Tier 4  1 year/KRW 30 Art. 68(1) (eight) Art. 446 (sixty-three) 
a) If the amount of damages arising out of criminal conduct exceeds KRW 500 
million, the maximum sentence ranges from 3 years to life.  Capital Markets Act, 
Art. 443(2). 
Source: Banking Act & Capital Markets Act 
 
[TABLE 3]  CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND SANCTIONS UNDER THE 
INSURANCE BUSINESS ACT 
Tier Sanctions (in years/KRW 
million) 
Statutory Provisions Number of Categories of 
Criminal Conduct 
Tier 1  10 years/KRW 50 Art. 197 One 
Tier 2  7 years/KRW 40 Arts. 198 & 199 Five  
Tier 3  5 years/KRW 30 Arts 200 & 201 Six  
Tier 4  3 years/KRW 20 Art. 202 Six 
Tier 5  1year/KRW 10 Art.203 Thirteen 
Source: Insurance Business Act 
 
The current criminal sanctions are quite mechanical, at least in terms 
of statutory provisions.  Minor failures to report a quarterly report, for 
example, go to the catch-all administrative fine section.65  Except for those 
minor infractions, almost every violation of statutory prohibitions or other 
                                           
64
  See supra notes 31-32 (citing revisions of the Banking Act and Insurance Business Act). 
65
  Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, art. 449(1)-(13).  Violations that are subject to 
administrative fines are perceived to be less egregious than those subject to criminal sanctions.  However, 
such a distinction does not always make sense.  For example, a failure to institute internal control systems 
is a serious violation, yet it is only subject to administrative fines.  See id. art. 449(1)-(9). 
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requirement falls within one of four or five categories and each category 
corresponds with a certain combination of imprisonment and fines.66   
There is much room for improvement.  First, it is undesirable to 
criminalize every violation of almost every section in the tripartite statutes.67  
This is the archetypal over-criminalization of government policies. 68  
Criminal conduct should be limited to critical violations that would damage 
the system itself.  Only price manipulation, insider trading, and false 
accounting should be conceptualized as securities crimes.  Second, 
imprisonment for up to ten years should not merely be an alternative to a 
KRW 500 million fine.69   Imprisonment, along with the confiscation of 
economic gains, would be a better option because violations could be more 
effectively deterred by making them costly.70  Third, it should be considered 
whether ten years is an appropriate maximum term of imprisonment.  For 
example, in the case of capital market fraud, the current maximum term of 
five years is disproportionate to the violations; a longer term would be more 
appropriate. 71   Finally, the scope of discretion permitted by the Capital 
Markets Act is too broad.  The same violation could be subject to ten years 
imprisonment and/or a fine of KRW 500 million.72  This wide discretion 
within the hands of the prosecutor’s office and the judicial branch should be 
controlled, or at least checked, to prevent any abuse of discretion. 
2. Liability 
The prohibitions and requirements under the tripartite statutes are 
addressed to individuals, corporate entities, or both.  For example, individual 
CEOs not only must certify the accuracy of periodic filing statements of 
their investment banking houses, but must also file their own personal 
periodic reports with the Financial Services Commission.  Regarding 
criminal sanctions, the complex relationship between an individual and the 
                                           
66
  See id. arts. 197-204. 
67
  In-Bong Jang, supra note 49, at 257-58.  
68
  See, e.g, John Hasnas, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime: Ethics and the Problem of 
White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579 (2005).  
69
  See Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 66(1).  
70
 The Capital Markets Act provides for the possibility of dual sanctions: imprisonment and criminal 
fines.  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 447.  For tier one violations, fines equal treble damages—
three times the amount of gains acquired or loss avoided. Id.  This treble damage concept should be 
expanded to violations under tiers two through four, though it may not always be easy to calculate the 
amount of gains or loss, depending on the violation type. 
71
  Id. art. 444(13). 
72
  Id. art. 443. 
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corporate entity for which the individual is working presents a challenging 
legal issue.73 
The tripartite statutes have one section in common—dual penalty 
clauses.74   Under the clause, if an individual violates the obligations or 
prohibitions under applicable statutes, the corporate entity shall also be held 
responsible for a fine.75  If the corporate entity breaches its obligation under 
the applicable statutes, the corporate entity as well as individuals shall be 
subject to criminal sanctions.76  This type of clause is common to almost 
every regulatory statute in Korea,77 but their desirability and scope remains 
controversial. 78   Because a corporation is a hypothetical legal creation, 
corporate criminal liability due to individual misconduct creates a more 
mysterious concept; some scholars argue the individual must bear the blame, 
while others rely on respondeat superior to implicate the corporation.79 
The dual penalty clauses under the tripartite statutes raise the question 
of whether a corporate entity could or should be subject to criminal 
sanctions, and if so, when and how.80  Despite many discussions about the 
desirability or theoretical possibility of corporate criminal liability, 
corporations are, in reality and by nature, only subject to a fine.81  The 
practical issue is under what conditions a corporate entity should be held 
responsible for an individual’s conduct.  In general, corporations are liable 
                                           
73
  See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J. L. & POL’Y 15, 19 (2010). 
74
  See Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 68(2); Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 448; Insurance 
Business Act, supra note 28, art. 208. 
75
  Id. 
76
  Id. 
77
  MINISTRY OF LEGISLATION, REVIEW STANDARDS OF STATUTES 492-99 (2006). 
78
  See infra note 83. 
79
  See, e.g., Susanne Beck, Meditating the Different Concepts of Corporate Criminal Liability in 
England and Germany, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1093, 1110 (2010); Elizabeth A. Plimpton & Danielle Walsh, 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331, 332 (2010); Abigail H. Lipman, Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359, 361-65 (2009). 
80
  Some commentators advocate for limits on corporate criminal liability.  See, e.g., John Hasnas, 
The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1329 (2009); COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, 2006 INTERIM REPORT SCORECARD 13 
(2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2006_Scorecard.pdf; Andrew Weissmann, A New 
Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1319-24 (2007) (“[T]he Justice 
Department [should] revise its prosecutorial guidelines so that firms are only prosecuted in exceptional 
circumstances of pervasive culpability throughout all offices and ranks.”).  Other scholars support some 
form of criminal liability for corporations.  See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482 (2009) (“corporations are not, fundamentally, 
fictional entities”); Barry J. Pollack, Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1393, 1413 (2009) (suggesting collective criminal intent 
approach). 
81
  The liquidation of a business or the temporary suspension of its license is, in effect, the same as a 
death sentence or imprisonment for an individual; such measures, however, are not penal sanctions, but 
administrative sanctions. 
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for the acts of employees if the employees are acting within the scope of 
their employment for the benefit of the corporation.82  The tricky question is 
whether the intent of the individual should be automatically imputed to the 
corporation, without the corporation’s own negligence being a factor.  The 
dual penalty clauses in many administrative laws used to have no reference 
to this issue.83  After the Korean Constitutional Court rendered unlimited 
dual penalty clauses unconstitutional in several cases,84 however, new words 
were added to the effect that a corporate entity is responsible only if it fails 
to exercise due care over the supervision of the relevant matter.85  This new 
law compels corporate entities to use due diligence in order to avoid 
criminal sanctions.  
In addition, the tripartite statutes are unclear as to whether an 
individual or a corporate entity should be held responsible for having aided 
or abetted other companies that violated legal prohibitions or demands.86  A 
traditional judicially-imposed theory is that criminal sanctions based on 
regulatory administrative statutes can be imposed on aiders and abettors to 
the same extent as principals; this is unlike the weaker liability for aiders and 
abettors found in the Criminal Act. 87   Such exceptional treatment for 
regulatory administrative law violators, however, should be clearly grounded 
in statute, not judicial interpretation.  Furthermore, it is doubtful that 
criminal sanctions based on regulatory administrative statutes should be 
distinguished from the crimes under the Criminal Act. 88   If aiders and 
abettors are generally responsible under the Criminal Act,89 and corporate 
entities are also responsible for individuals under the dual penalty clause,90 
                                           
82
  See Beale, supra note 80, at 1488 (noting that in the United States, the legal ground for civil 
corporate responsibility for a single employee’s actions is respondeat superior).  
83
  For example, art. 68(2) of the Banking Act was revised on May 17, 2010 to silence discussions 
about constitutionality of uniform dual penalty clauses. 
84
  See, e.g., Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2008 HUNGA10, Jul. 30, 2009; see also Change Seok 
Park, A Study on the Judgment of Unconstitutionality on the Joint Penal Provisions, 16 J. SOC. SCI. 149 
(2010); Byung-Sun Cho, Corporate Criminal Liability in Recently Revised Joint Penal Provisions, 21 
CRIM. POL’Y 351 (2009). 
85
  See, e.g., Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 448 (requiring failure of due care for corporate 
criminal liability); Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 68(2) (same); Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, 
art. 208 (same).  
86
  Compare Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000DO90, Jan. 25, 2001 (rejecting accomplice liability for 
insider trading) with S. Ct., 2001DO4947, Jul. 26, 2002 (recognizing accomplice liability for price 
manipulation).  
87
  See Hyongbup [Criminal Act], Act No. 293, Sept. 18, 1953, amended by Act No. 7623, Jul. 29, 
2005, art. 32 [hereinafter Criminal Act] (providing for reduced penalties for accomplices). 
88
  See Keun-Woo Lee, Address at Korea Criminal Law Study Group: A Critical Analysis on 
Administrative Criminal Law Theory (2009).  See also Kwan Hoon Kwak, The Problem and Improvement 
of Administrative Regulations on Unlawful Corporate Acts, 19 K. MGMT. L. 75 (2008). 
89
  See Criminal Act, supra note 87, arts. 31-32. 
90
  See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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then prosecutors may be able to argue for a higher degree of liability for 
corporate criminals than for individuals under the tripartite statutes.  Because 
the Korean Constitution outlaws double jeopardy and ensures the right to a 
fair trial,91 these acts may push the limits of constitutionality. 
3. Investigative Procedure 
As discussed above, the Financial Services Commission, the 
Securities and Futures Commission, and the Financial Supervisory Services 
have the authority to investigate and determine market misconduct. 92  For 
unfair transactions and certain other types of misbehavior in the capital 
market, the Securities and Futures Commission has the authority to 
determine the ultimate measures to be imposed on rule-violating investment 
banks. 93  At the same time, banks and insurance companies are subject to the 
sanctions imposed by the Financial Services Commission.  Thus, the 
relationship between the Financial Services Commission and the Securities 
and Futures Commission is not always clear. 
Even if the violators are investigated and indicted by the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, Financial Supervisory Services would perform the 
initial phase of the investigation as a matter of practice.94  Table 4 illustrates 
the volume and outcome of investigations performed by the Financial 
Supervisory Services for the past several years. 
 
[TABLE 4]  DISPOSAL OF CASES 
Year Notice to 
Prosecutor’s 
Office 
Orders to return 





2005 186 56 17 259 
2006 132 24 9 165 
2007 138 50 14 202 
2008 115 35 7 157 
2009 142 16 18 176 
Source: Financial Supervisory Services 2009 YEARBOOK 
 
However, the Seoul Central District Court recently held that Financial 
Supervisory Services officials had no authority to prepare legally valid 
                                           
91
  Daehanminkuk Hunbeob [Constitution] arts. 12-13, 27. 
92
  Financial Services Commission Act, see supra note 39, art. 17(4); supra notes 42-43 and 
accompanying text. 
93
  Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, arts. 19-23; Capital Markets Act, supra note 
16, art. 439. 
94
  A recent investigation of a corporation by the public prosecutor’s office is an exception to the 
general practice. 
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interrogatories at the request of the Securities and Futures Commission, 
because the officials cannot be regarded as special police.95  However, it 
seems legitimate and reasonable to support the investigatory authority of the 
Financial Supervisory Services, as it is the most important organization that 
has the necessary expertise on the capital market, and thus should be 
responsible for the initial phase of the investigation.  One solution would be 
to designate the appropriate Financial Supervisory Services officials as 
special police.  Another solution would be to add procedural safeguards to 
the Capital Markets Act relating to the Financial Supervisory Services’ 
investigative procedures. 
B. Administrative Sanctions 
For less serious violations, the Financial Services Commission, upon 
investigation, can issue administrative orders in addition to, or instead of 
criminal sanctions.96  Such orders can be addressed to the firms and/or the 
individuals.97  If revocation of a business license is comparable to a death 
sentence for an individual, suspension of license is equivalent to 
imprisonment.  Furthermore, suspension of a business license can cause 
more substantial economic loss to the business entity than a fine.  
Accordingly, administrative sanctions can be more effective and less costly 
for enforcement than criminal sanctions. 
1. Revocation or Suspension of Licenses 
The Financial Services Commission can issue various orders to a 
financial investment business that has violated the Capital Markets Act.98  
The most devastating order the agency may issue is the revocation of a 
business license.99  The Capital Markets Act lists eight specific grounds for 
imposing such a measure100 in order to prevent abuse of enforcement.  If a 
business’ licenses are revoked, the business entity must be liquidated.101  
                                           
95
  Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C. Dist. Ct.], 2010 KOHAP 11, Jan. 28, 2011. 
96
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 420-22. 
97
  See generally Regulations on Capital Market Investigation Matters, FSC Public Notice No. 2009-
15, amended by FSC Public Notice No. 2010-26, Schedule 2 (Sep. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Reg. Inv.] 
(providing a formula to calculate the amount of civil fines); Regulations on Audits and Sanctions of 
Financial Institutions, FSC Public Notice No. 2000-31, amended by FSC Public Notice No. 2010-38 (Nov. 
12, 2010) [hereinafter Reg. A&S].  
98
  See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 420-22, 428, 429. 
99
  Id. art. 420(1). 
100
  Id.  Items include fraud, violation of conditions for a license, doing business during the suspension 
period, and failure to fulfill an FSC corrective or cease and desist order. Id. 
101
  Id. art. 420(2). 
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Foreign financial investment business entities are also subject to the same 
sanctions, but on different grounds.102   
Because revocation of licenses can be a death sentence to a 
corporation’s existence, the Financial Services Commission is required to 
have formal hearings before issuing this sentence. 103   For less serious 
violations, the Financial Services Commission may: 1) suspend all or part of 
a business for up to six months; 2) transfer trust contracts; 3) correct or 
suspend business activities in violation; 4) make a public announcement of 
the sanctions; 104  5) issue a warning; 6) issue a reprimand; or 7) issue 
miscellaneous sanctions.105  Due to the Administrative Procedure Act, these 
measures also require notice and a hearing.106  As long as due process is 
secured, business license-related sanctions are desirable for efficiency and 
should be utilized more often than criminal sanctions.  This would ultimately 
help financial institutions continue business with their customers.  The issue 
is then how to ensure procedural protection for the customers. 
2. Civil Fines 
Civil fines were introduced into the Korean legal system as part of the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in 1980.107  Based on the Act, the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission has established a new financial model for 
developing additional revenue sources by imposing astronomically high civil 
fines for the past several years.108  Table 5 shows the enormity of civil fines 
perpetuated by the Fair Trade Commission. 
                                           
102
  Id. art. 421. 
103
  Id. art. 423. 
104
  Regarding the constitutionality of mandatory public apology, see Const. Ct., 89HUNMA160, Apr. 
1, 1991 (holding the public announcement of illegal conduct and a sanction of mandatory apology are not 
unconstitutional). 
105
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 420(3).  FSC may be able to sign with the applicable 
financial institutions a confirmation about the improvement of situations or a memorandum of 
understanding to rectify the wrongs.  Reg. A&S, supra note 97, arts. 20-22.  In the case of financial 
institutions in default, FSC also has the authority to take a variety of measures, including a petition for 
bankruptcy pursuant to the Law on Restructuring of Financial Institutions.  Id.; see also S. Ct., 
2004DOO13219, Jul. 28, 2006 (denying the administrative proceeding about the legality of such petition). 
106
  Haengjungjulcha beob [Administrative Procedure Act], art. 3.  Further procedural protections 
generally apply for those facing administrative sanctions.  See Reg. Inv., supra note 97, art. 36 (requiring 
FSC to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard).  
107
  Hae-Shik Park, The Legal Character of Civil Penalties on Unlawful Assistance under MRFTA, 8 
K. COMP. L. STUDY 225, 231-32 (2002).  This article uses the term “civil fine” to mean a severe penalty, 
while reserving “administrative fine” to refer to a sanction for minor misbehavior.  “Civil fines” are 
different from “enforcement penalties,” which are monetary sanctions issued when an agency’s specific 
order to a violator is not followed.  
108
  Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”), Status Report to National Assembly, 28 (Oct. 5, 2010).  
The amount of civil fines tends to increase rapidly except for during election periods.  Id.  For January 




[TABLE 5]  KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION CIVIL FINES RECORD 
Year 
Total Amount Collected 
Through Civil Fines Imposed 
(KRW Million) 
Number of Cases 
2004 36,308 91 
2005 259,063 274 
2006 175,261 157 
2007 423,398 326 
2008 272,869 141 
2009 371,035 78 
Jan.-Aug. 2010 458,762 39 
Total 1,996,696 1,106 
Source: KFTC, Status Report to National Assembly, 28 (Oct. 5, 2010) 
 
Civil fines are imposed in the case of almost every violation of the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.109  Other government agencies, 
such as the Financial Services Commission and the Korea Communications 
Commission, have followed suit.110  Civil fines are sometimes offered as an 
alternative to the revocation of a business license or as levies on pollution.111  
Civil fines have become a favored sanction under all administrative 
statutes.112  
Strong criticism of and legal challenges against excessive civil fines 
have been unsuccessful.113  In reality, the economic effect of civil fines is the 
same as criminal fines, and it was a thorny issue whether procedural 
safeguards under the Korean Criminal Procedural Act should apply for civil 
fines. 114   Legal challenges based on double jeopardy, due process, 
                                                                                                                              
through August 2010, though the number of cases was less than the annual average, the total amount of 
civil fines far exceeded the total in 2009.  Id. 
109
  See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, amended by Act No. 
8635, Aug. 3, 2007, arts. 6, 17, 24(2), 28, 31(2). 
110
  See Press Release, FSC, Study on Civil Fines on Unfair Trade Practices in Capital Markets (Mar. 
4, 2010).  In addition to FSC, Korea Communications Commission (“KCC”) has frequently levied civil 
fines to telecommunications companies.  See, e.g., Press Release, KCC, Civil Fines on Three Wireless Data 
Service Telcos, (Dec. 2, 2010).  The amount of fines in this case was KRW 8.4 billion, id., which is modest 
compared to the huge sales revenues of the three oligopolistic telecommunications companies. 
111
  See, e.g., Water Quality and Ecosystem Preservation Act, Act No. 7459, Mar. 31, 2005, amended 
by Act No. 10615, art. 41. 
112
  Ba Young-Kil Bae, A Study on the Administrative Money Penalty System, 3 K. PUB. L. STUDY 
241, 246 (2002).  In 2001, 51 statutes had civil penalty clauses; as of Apr. 2002, the number of statutes was 
75.  Id. 
113
  The initial purpose was to deprive the violators of the illegal profits, but later fines were 
introduced as punitive sanctions.  Sang Kook Han, Money Penalties for Tax Crimes, 76 FIN. FORUM 6, 12 
(2003).  As to the constitutionality of civil fines, see Const. Ct., 99HUNGA18, May 31, 2001, in which the 
Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of civil fines.   
114
  Byung-Duck Chung, A Study on the Legal Characterization of the Penalty Surcharges in 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, 15 K. MGMT. L. EV. 465, 484 (2005).  Another form of fine is 
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presumption of innocence, uncontrolled discretion, or the proportionality 
principle have been futile.115  Alternatively, other milder procedural control 
methods have been discussed, such as providing explanations of the 
reasoning behind decisions;116  refining the relevant market and violation 
periods;117  and implementing a two-factor formula assessing impact and 
materiality.118  These have been proposed and partially implemented by the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission. 119   For now, any further protections for 
alleged violators are not de lege lata [the law as it exists], but de lege 
ferenda [the law as it should be]. 
Civil fines became part of the enforcement mechanism relating to 
financial services market crimes when the Securities and Exchanges Act and 
the Banking Act were revised in 2001120 and 2002,121 respectively.122  Civil 
fines for financial market crimes are tightly regulated compared to 
regulation under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act; the illegal 
conduct subject to civil fines is restricted.  Regarding capital markets, only 
certain violations are subject to civil fines: violations regarding related party 
transactions,123 registration statements,124 tender offer filings,125 and periodic 
                                                                                                                              
the enforcement penalty, a monetary sanction issued when an agency’s specific order to a violator is not 
followed.  Since 1991, when the Construction Act introduced this system, it has spread to 21 other statutes 
by 2008, including adoption by the Banking Act.  See Kwan Hoon Kwak, supra note 88, at 87.  
115
  Cons. Ct., 2001HUNGA25, Jul. 24, 2003; S. Ct., 2000TII6206, Feb. 9, 2001; S. Ct., 
2006DOO4554, Jul. 12, 2007; S. Ct., 2001DOO6517, Apr. 23, 2004; S. Ct., 2001DOO7220, Mar. 12, 
2004; S. Ct., 2006DOO4226, Feb. 15, 2008; see also Sam-Hyun Chun, The Legal Problems of Surcharges 
on the Unfair Trade Act, 21 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 203 (2008). 
116
  Hae-Shik Park, supra note 107, at 247. 
117
  See Jinsoo Yoo & Namhoon Kwon, Policies Against Collusion: Current Trends and Critical 
Issues, 15 IND. ORG. STUDY 83, 96-99 (2007) (discussing evaluation criteria to determine the termination 
date of a collusion). 
118
  Taehi Hwang, A Legal Study on Setting the Basic Amount of Surcharges in Relation to the Cartel, 
50 SEOUL L.J. 401, 402 (2009).  
119
  See Notice on Detailed Standards of Calculation of Civil Fines, KFTC Notification No. 2001-6 
(Jun. 1, 2001), amended by KFTC Notification No. 2010-9 (Oct. 20, 2010). 
120
  See Jeunggwongeorae beob [Securities and Exchanges Act], Act No. 972, Apr. 1, 1962, amended 
by Act No. 8985, Mar. 21, 2008, art. 206(11-16) [hereinafter Securities and Exchanges Act]; Capital 
Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 428. 
121
  See Banking Act, supra note 16, arts. 65(3-11). 
122
  Several additional statutes provide for civil fines as enforcement mechanisms.  See Insurance 
Business Act, supra note 28, art. 196; Sangho Jeochook Eunhangbup [Mutual Saving Bank Law], Act No. 
2333, Aug. 2, 1972, amended by Act. No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010, arts. 38(2)-(8); Yeoshin Chunmoon 
Gwemyungupbup [Credit Facility Specialty Business Law], Act No. 5374, Aug. 28, 1997, amended by Act 
No. 10564, Apr. 7, 2011, art. 58; Gwemyung Jeejoo Hoesabup [Finance Holding Company Law], Act No. 
6274, Oct. 23, 2000, amended by Act No. 10361, Dec. 9, 2010, art. 64. 
123
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 428(1), 428(34).  Here, a civil fine is an alternative to 
suspension of business activities under Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 420(2). 
124
  Id. arts. 429(1)(119), 429(1)(122)-(123). 
125
  Id. art. 429(2)(142).  
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disclosure.126  Only in a case involving malice or gross negligence will the 
context, degree, period, frequency, and unlawful gains be weighed in 
determining the amount of a fine. 127   Relevant parties shall have the 
opportunity to present their opinions or materials.128  One may object to such 
an order within 30 days to the Financial Services Commission, in which case 
the Commission has up to 90 days for reexamination.129  The Financial 
Services Commission follows a similar procedure when implementing the 
Banking Act and the Insurance Business Act.130 
The civil fine procedures for financial market crimes leave a lot of 
room for improvement in terms of substance and procedure.  Table 6 shows 
the overall schematics of civil fines, showing the violations subject to civil 
fines are inconsistent among banks, financial investment firms, and 
insurance companies.  The differences in the nature of banking, insurance, 
and investment banking do not justify such an inconsistency and thus the 
situation should be rectified. 131  In addition, the size of the penalties are 
inadequate considering their impact on an investor’s trust in capital markets, 
especially when compared to the size of fines under the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act.132  The fines should be increased so violators 
are paying more when they are fined.  Finally, the prior notice and hearing 
procedure should be more formally regulated to ensure procedural 
safeguards are in place.133  
 
                                           
126
  Id. arts. 429(3)(159), 429(3)(160)-(161). 
127
  Id. art. 430.  
128
  Id. art. 431. 
129
  Id. art. 432. 
130
  See Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 65(5)-(6); Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, art. 196(4).  
131
  The fines and their methods of calculation vary greatly across the various financial services fields.  
See Reg. A&S, supra note 97; Reg. Inv., supra note 97. 
132
  Yong-Chan Lee, Monetary Sanctions on Financial Institutions in Korea: Problems and Proposals 
for Improvement, 9 CHOONGANG L. REV. 537, 557-64 (2007).  Lee argues that the number of minor 
violations subject to administrative fines should be expanded, while civil penalties could be more 
restrained.  Id.  However, the misdeeds subject to civil fines seem to be serious enough to warrant steep 
financial penalties.  Id.  The real regulatory policy goal seems to be consistency among three business lines. 
Id.   
133
  See Young Shin Yoon, Price Manipulation by Trading, 2 K. J. SEC. L. 1 (2001) (critiquing 
subjective standards for sanctions); see also Regulations on Committee Meeting and Case Management, 
KFTC Public Notice No. 2000-8, amended by KFTC Public Notice No. 2009-64 (Dec. 7, 2009) [hereinafter 
Regulations on Case Management].  
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[TABLE 6]  CIVIL FINES UNDER THE BANKING ACT, CAPITAL 
MARKETS ACT, & INSURANCE BUSINESS ACT 
 Grounds Basis Rates Factors 
Banks Loan limit to one entity, limit 
on equity investm’t, loan limit 
to large shareholders, limit on 
investm’t in large shareholder’s 
equity, limit on investm’t in 
real estate, etc.; influence by 






Duration, track record, 
damage/profit, motive, 




Kickback, limit on asset 
managem’t, transaction with 









Transaction with or investm’t 
in large shareholders, 
shareholders, investm’t in large 
shareholders, misrepresentation 
in registration statem’t, tender 











(impact on operating 
profits or equity, cash 
flow, contingent 
liability), cooperation, 
track record, voluntary 
report, loss to 
investors 
Source: Banking Act, Capital Markets Act, and Insurance Business Act 
 
In practice, fines have not been prevalent.  For the first half of 2010, 
the Securities and Futures Commission filed 89 cases based on disclosure 
violations, among which only eight cases resulted in civil fines (totaling 
KRW 471 million).134  As for banks and insurance companies, the Financial 
Services Commission issued eleven civil fines in 2010, which ranged from 
KRW 23 million to 4.5 billion.135  The trend seems to be moving towards 
imposing civil fines more frequently.136  Nevertheless, the fines themselves 
are meager compared to the amount of civil fines imposed by the KFTC, as 
shown in Table 5, above.  The basis amount should be the amount involved 
in the illegal transaction rather than the fixed amount stipulated in the rules.  
                                           
134
  Information on Regulatory Reform Resolutions, SFC, 
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/con_stcc_list.jsp?menu=7220200&bbsid=BBS0025 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).  
Of the remaining cases, three resulted in criminal indictments, one in a recommendation of management 
termination, nine in administrative fines (minor fines of lesser quantity than the more serious “civil fines”), 
and the remaining sixty-eight in warnings.  Id. 
135
   Sanctions Information, FSC, 
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/con_sanc_list.jsp?menu=7220300&bbsid=BBS0122 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).  
In 2010, 86 banks were warned while in 35 cases executives were reprimanded.  Id. 
136
  In 2010, SFC adopted sanctions on disclosure violations six times and all those resolutions 
included civil fines.  See, e.g., Press Release, FSS, Sanctions on Disclosure Violations (Nov. 24, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/nws/nbd/bodobbs_v.jsp?seqno=14755&no=38&gubun=01&menu=nws020100.  In 
contrast, in 2007 SFC adopted sanctions on disclosure violations six times and four resolutions included 
civil fines.  See Press Releases, FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/nws/nbd/bodobbs_l.jsp?gubun=01 (search for 
“disclosure violations”). 
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Furthermore, the rates of fines should go up in order for the civil fines to 
work effectively as sanctions and deterrents.137 
3. Censure of Executives 
In addition to corporate responsibility—or as an alternative to it—
executives can be held responsible on an individual level.  The Financial 
Services Commission has the authority to directly issue censures to 
executives, while employees are subject to similar sanctions at the request of 
the Financial Services Commission to the firm.138  The censures include 
termination, 139  suspension for up to six months, warning, 140  reprimand, 
notice, and other miscellaneous measures. 141   One possible censure for 
employees is reduction of compensation.  As in the revocation of a business 
license, termination or a request for termination requires a hearing.142  The 
Financial Services Commission must maintain records of such censure,143 
and the individual may file an objection with the Financial Services 
Commission.144   
Under the regulatory scheme, while the Financial Services 
Commission does not have direct authority over the executives or other 
employees of financial institutions, it nonetheless may request financial 
institutions take disadvantageous measures to remedy managerial 
mistakes.145  Therefore, it seems more desirable to have the shareholders of 
financial institutions consider the future of the incumbent management.   
                                           
137
  But see J. Karpoff, D. Lee & G. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUAN. ANA. 581-611 (2008) (arguing in the context of the United States that market-level enforcements 
such as the loss of market value when news of misconduct is reported can be more effective than civil 
fines). 
138
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 422; Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 54. 
139
  As to the effect of termination, see Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 18(1)(9).  See also Capital 
Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 24; Capital Markets Act E.D. supra note 48, art. 27.  For five years, they 
cannot be officers of other financial institutions.   
140
  As to the challenge to the legality of warning, see S. Ct., 2003DOO14765, Feb. 17, 2005. 
141
  Dong-Jun Choi, A Study of Current Situation and Legal Issues about the Disciplinary Warning 
Against Officers, 4 K. J. FIN. L. 129, 138 (2007). 
142
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 423. 
143
  Id. art. 424. 
144
  Id. art. 425. 
145
  Article 54 of the Banking Act, supra note 16, provides the following reasons for such an action:  
1) officers fail to comply with Financial Services Commission orders; or 2) officers damage the sound 
management of banks.  FSC may request the suspension of an officer, or recommend that dismissal be 
considered by shareholders.  Id. 
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C. Private Enforcement 
Although the regulatory agencies are primarily responsible for the 
protection of investors and efficient operation of the market system, they 
should be cautious not to be overly intrusive.  With too much agency 
authority and responsibility, paternalistic protectionism could outgrow 
market-based management.  Additionally, the regulatory agencies could not 
afford the financial cost of great supervisory responsibility.  Consequently, 
private enforcement should be a pivotal component of the enforcement 
mechanisms. 
1. Pre-Litigation Mechanisms 
In disputes involving financial transactions, alternative dispute 
resolution fits the situation best because the judicial branch lacks expertise.  
Furthermore, solutions might have to come from collective remedial 
measures such as an establishment of funds.  Prospective measures, such as 
revision of general terms and conditions, might be desirable.  Rituals in 
court on a case-by-case basis do not always provide the best solution.  Thus, 
using pre-litigation mechanisms is usually preferable, though this may 
depend on the situation. 
Mediation is one such solution.146  Although mediation is not binding, 
and thus of limited effect, the Financial Supervisory Services has a standing 
Dispute Resolution Committee.147  The most troublesome issue is whether 
mediation is appropriate for a dispute, in light of the mandatory nature of 
financial regulations.  For example, if a consumer argues about suitability or 
misrepresentation, whether it would be subject to mediation is not clear.148  
In addition, there is a potential conflict as a regulatory agency might be 
partially responsible for a dispute.  Nonetheless, the Financial Supervisory 
Services has been extremely successful and active in addressing consumer 
                                           
146
  Sangsoo Kim, Financial Dispute and ADR: The Comparison between Korea and Japan, 7 K. J. 
FIN. L. 145, 165-67 (2010). 
147
  Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, arts. 51-57. 
148
  See Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, art. 53(1)(2) (providing for the option of 
rejection by the FSC). 
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disputes involving financial intermediaries in Korea. 149  Thus, the Financial 
Supervisory Services has a plan to make mediation mandatory prior to 
litigation, and mediation unilaterally binding on the financial institutions.150  
In addition to the Financial Supervisory Services, KRX operates the Market 
Audit Committee, which has dispute resolution functions.151  KOFIA also 
runs a dispute resolution center for its members.152   
Arbitration can be more effective than mediation, as arbitration 
decisions are binding.  Unlike in the United States, however,153 most Korean 
contracts do not contain arbitration clauses in standard financial transaction 
documents.154  This might be partly due to the lack of expertise in arbitration 
at KRX and KOFIA.155  Even if we assume the relevant institutions do have 
the capability to arbitrate disputes, it remains unclear to what extent these 
disputes can be resolved by arbitration.  For example, whether churning, 
                                           
149
  Press Release, FSS, 2009 Disputes Statistics (Mar. 5, 2010). 
 Banks &  
Consumer Fin. 
Financial     
Investment 
Life Ins. Damage Ins. 
Filed, 2009 6,976 2,225 10,661 10,212 
Mediation Acc’d, 
2009 
50.2% 37.1% 43.7% 
Filed, 2008 5,200 1,163 7,393 7,269 
Filed, 2007 2,020 561 7,603 6,895 
Filed, 2006 2,154 470 8,681 7,084 
Filed, 2005 3,861 424 7,631 6,766 
See Press Release, FSS, 2009 Litigation Statistics (Mar. 11, 2010).  
Out of 28,988 cases filed with the FSS, 1,656 suits were filed with courts.  1,435 litigations were filed 
by financial institutions, not by consumers.  Out of 1,656 suits, 478 cases were settled. 
 Banks, etc. Financial     
Investment 
Life Ins. Damage Ins. 
Court cases 82 56 161 1,357 
Plaintiff FIG 30.5% 44.6% 73.3% 93.4% 
  
150
  FSS, 2009 Litigation Statistics, supra note 149 (citing cases in Germany and the United 
Kingdom); see also Bill 1809789 proposed by Cong. MHCho, et al., on Nov. 3, 2010 to amend the 
Financial Services Commission Act.  Art. 56 of the bill would require mediation before a suit is filed. 
151
  See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 405.  More information is available at Market 
Oversight Committee, KRX, 
http://www.krx.co.kr/m11/m11_1/m11_1_5/m11_1_5_5/UHPKOR11001_05_05.html (last visited May 13, 
2011). 
152
  See KOREAN FINANCIAL INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION (“KOFIA”), http://www.ksda.or.kr/ (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2011).  
153
  See Cheol Han, Securities Arbitration as a Means of Securities Disputes Resolution, 22 K. COMM. 
L. STUDY 393 (2003). 
154
  See, e.g., Standard Terms and Conditions for Customer Contracts, DONGBU SECURITIES, 
http://www.dongbuhappy.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).  Art. 22 on dispute resolution, however, 
provides for the customer’s right for mediation.  Id. 
155
  Joongjae beob [Arbitration Law], Act No. 6083, Dec.31, 1999.  The Arbitration Law was the first 
introduction of modern arbitration processes in Korea. 
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unauthorized trading, or misrepresentation issues in violation of the Capital 
Markets Act should be arbitrated or not is unclear.  Nonetheless, arbitration 
is a dispute resolution process with the potential to be more widely adopted 
in Korea. 
2. Litigation for Compensatory Damages 
In disputes with banks or insurance companies, account holders or 
insurance buyers can recover damages from the institutions if a breach of 
contract occurs.156  Likewise, dealers and brokers can compensate capital 
market investors with damages.  For overtrading 157  and unauthorized 
trading,158 Korean courts tend to allow such litigation liberally, although the 
amount of damages awarded is usually limited.159 
In cases of misrepresentation, insider trading, and unfair trading, the 
Capital Markets Act stipulates a private cause of action. 160  
Misrepresentation or omission of representation on material items in a 
registration statement would lead the issuers, directors,161 and advisors (such 
as accountants162 and underwriters163) to be jointly and severally liable for 
damages.164  They are also responsible for damages due to misrepresentation 
or failure to represent major items in periodic and continuous disclosure 
documents. 165   Anyone charged with insider trading is also liable for 
damages to investors who experienced loss in connection with the crime.166  
                                           
156
  Min beob [Civil Code], Act No. 461, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act No. 10549, Mar. 7, 2011, art. 
390. 
157
  Kim, Yongjae, Suggestions to the Reform of the Churning Regulation under the Capital Market 
and Financial Investment Services Act, 8 K. J. SEC. L.117 (2007).  
158
  Gi-Hun Kwon, The Restriction on Discretionary Transactions in Futures Trading, 15 K. COMM. 
CASE STUDY 329, 353-355 (2003); Bok-ki Hong, A Claim for Damages Caused by Discretionary Trading 
of Stocks and Unreasonable Recommendation by Brokers, 15 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 131 (2003). 
159
  E.g., Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 90NA21577, Jan. 23, 1991. 
160
  See generally KSLA, STUDY ON SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF SECURITIES-RELATED DAMAGE 
CLAIMS (2003). 
161
 S. Ct., 2006DA68636, Sep. 11, 2008 (regarding Daewoo directors); Seoul High Ct., 
2006NA14648, Sep. 13, 2006.  
162
  Seoul C. Dist. Ct., 2003KAHAP77160, May 19, 2005 (regarding the CPA firm of POSNIK); S. 
Ct., 97DA26555, Oct. 22, 1999 (regarding the CPA firm of Korea Steel Pipe). 
163
  Seoul District Court, 2000NA32740, Nov. 23, 2000 (regarding the underwriter of Hanil 
Securities); Seoul High Ct., 2000NA10828/10835, Jan. 9, 2001 (regarding the underwriter of Yent). 
164
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 125; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120, art. 
14.  As to a plaintiff’s standing, see Dae-Sub Kang, Standing to Sue Claims under Section 14 of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 19 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 219 (2006). 
165
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 162; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120, art. 
186(5); S. Ct., 2002DA38521, Oct. 11, 2002 (regarding Daewoo Electronics). 
166
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 174; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120, arts. 
14, 188(3); see Seoul High Ct., 94NA21162, Jun. 14, 1995 (limiting plaintiffs to contemporaneous 
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Any unfair trader, including one who has manipulated the market price, is 
also liable for the damages arising out of such trading.167 
3. Class Action 
After plenty of debate over the pros and cons of class action 
lawsuits,168 the Securities-Related Class Action Act (“Securities Class Action 
Act”) passed the National Assembly in 2004, becoming effective January 1, 
2005.169  As for the listed companies, whose assets are less than KRW 2 
trillion, it applies to actions after Jan. 1, 2007.170  Large listed companies 
also had a two-year reconciliation period. 171  Though the Securities Class 
Action Act became fully effective on January 1, 2007, not a single class 
action had been filed until recently.  On April 13, 2009, the first Korean class 
action suit was filed against Jinsung TEC for its failure to disclose loss from 
derivative trading in the first half of the year until it filed its third quarter 
report; the parties subsequently settled. 172   Due in part to a lack of 
compensation for the class representative’s time and efforts, many expect the 
Securities Class Action Act to become a dead letter.  Excessive filing is a 
phantom horror, as there have been only two suits filed.   
                                                                                                                              
investors); Dae Sub Kang, Case Comments, 7 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 359 (1996) (discussing formulation 
of damages). 
167
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 177, 179; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120, 
art. 188(5). Kim, Joo-Young et al., Calculation of Damages in Stock Price Manipulation Cases, 2 K. J. 
SEC. L. 111 (2001).  Seoul High Ct., 2000NA22456, Dec. 5, 2000 (deeming the highest price in the prior 
six months to be the market price). 
168
  See, e.g., Jong Seok Shin, A Study on Securities-Related Class Action, 34 K. L. STUD. 295 (2009); 
Jin-Yi Choi, A Study on the Issues and Improvement of the Class Action Law Concerned with Securities, 23 
K. ENT. L. REV. 299 (2009); Jung Hoo Oh, Critical View on Class Action from Civil Procedural Law, 5 K. 
J. SEC. L. 255 (2004); Jun-Seob Yi, Issues on Reform on Legal Liability System in Securities Exchange Act 
after the Introduction of Class Action, 4 K. J. SEC. L. 1 (2003). 
169
  Securities-Related Class Action Act, Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 10208, 
Mar. 31, 2010 [hereinafter Securities Class Action Act]. 
170
  Id., amended by Act No. 7387, Mar. 10, 2005, art. 3. 
171
  Id. art. 4. 
172
  Sung Tae Kim, A Study on Representative Parties in the Securities Class Action Law, 24 
SOONGSIL. L. REV. 195 (2010).  Public notices of Suwon District Court decisions to permit class actions, 
settlement agreement, etc. are available at Securities Class Action Lawsuits, SUPREME COURT OF KOREA, 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/stock/stocklist_temp.jsp (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).  More recently, on Jan. 7, 2010, 
the second class action suit was filed as Case No. 10GAHAP1604 against Royal Bank of Canada.  See the 
public notice of the class action on the above Supreme Court website bulletin board (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011).  The cause of action was the price manipulation of the equity-linked securities issued by Hanwha 
Securities.  As to these securities, Seoul Central District Court rendered a decision in favor of the buyers in 
2009GAHAP90394, Jul. 1, 2010. 
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It is proposed that limits on causes of action and legal representation 
under the Securities Class Action Act be abolished.173  Currently, causes of 
action are limited to misrepresentations in registration statement, 
misrepresentations in periodic or continuous disclosure documents, insider 
trading, and outside auditors’ liability.174  The current list of causes of action 
for class actions should be expanded more broadly so that any massive 
disputes such as product liability and other types of investor loss could be 
resolved by class action.175  In addition, the Securities Class Action Act 
limits legal representation on three cases for three years.176  The restriction 
on representation of plaintiffs in class actions should be immediately 
abolished. 
IV. EX ANTE MEASURES 
Korea should limit ex post facto measures on violators and utilize 
more ex ante measures because they are always less costly and more 
effective.  Like infectious diseases, it is best to prevent legal disputes from 
occurring through preventive means.  Accordingly, Korean law calls on 
financial institutions to take seemingly vigorous ex ante measures.177 
A. Compliance Officer 
A compliance officer within a corporate organization is directly linked 
to corporate governance issues.  Within the basic structure of financial 
institutions in Korea, the board has a “duty of care” to monitor business 
operations. 178   For large financial investment companies, 179  the board is 
                                           
173
  Bill No. 1803630, which would delimit the restrictions on causes of action, is pending at the 
National Assembly.  Alternatively, another proposed bill would expand the causes of action available to 
include product defects liability and other claims.  See Bill No. 1801701.  
174
  Securities Class Action Act, supra note 169, art. 3. 
175
  For example, server computer downtime or disclosure of personal information by financial 
institutions can be considered.  Farmers Coop & Hyundai Capital Facing Collective Action, SEOUL NEWS, 
Apr. 18, 2011, http://www.Seoul.co.kr.  
176
  Securities Class Action Act, supra note 169, art. 11(3). 
177
  The compliance concept was initially introduced into Korean law through the audit committee 
concept.  Sang beop [Amendment Law] Act No. 6086, Dec. 31, 1999, art. 415(2). 
178
  S. Ct., 2002DA60467/60474, Dec. 10, 2004 (regarding Dongbang Peregrin director purchasing 
unguaranteed CP, buying back Midopa shares acquired in the name of third parties, and investing in pre-
KOSDAQ shares); S. Ct., 2006DA68636, Sep. 11, 2008 (regarding Daewoo director for cooking books). 
For the most recent discussions about duty of oversight in the United States, see MICHAEL D. GREENBERG, 
RAND CENTER FOR CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, DIRECTORS AS 
GUARDIANS OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WITHIN THE CORPORATE CITADEL (2010). 
179
  If the asset is KRWT or more, it is a large financial institution regardless of whether its shares are 
floated or not.  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 25; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48; 
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required to have one-half or a majority of independent directors; three or 
more non-standing, outsider directors 180  set up the director nomination 
committee 181  and the audit committee, 182  which are independent of the 
board.  For smaller financial investment companies, a standing independent 
auditor is required.183  They are all subject to outside audits for accounting 
matters.184  Corporate governance of banks and insurance companies is the 
same as for large investment companies.185  Notwithstanding this panoply of 
gatekeepers, which is confusingly diverse, the compliance officer system 
was introduced to financial institutions in 2000 in the midst of the Asian 
financial crisis.186 
The board of financial institutions is required to nominate a 
compliance officer.187  His or her qualifications, such as work or research 
experience, must be excellent. 188   To ensure independence, compliance 
officers are prohibited from engaging in other business activities. 189  
Compliance officers have the authority to request that management produce 
                                                                                                                              
Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, art. 15.  As such, many life insurance companies are treated large 
even before their demutualization. 
180
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 25.  As for the qualification of outside directors, see id. 
art. 25(5). 
181
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 25(2).  One-half of the nomination committee must be 
outside directors.  Id. 
182
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 26.  Two-thirds must be outside directors.  Id.  One 
member must have expertise in accounting.  Id. 
183
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 27.  If the assets are less than KRW 100 billion, this 
requirement is waived.  Id. art. 20.  Thus, “smaller financial institutions” refers to companies with assets 
that are between KRW 100 billion and KRW 2 trillion.  If the company has an audit committee, then a 
standing auditor is not required. 
184
  Chushikhoesae oebugamsae gwanhan beopyul [Act on External Audits of Stock Companies], Act 
No. 3297, Dec. 31, 1980, amended by Act No. 10303, May. 17, 2010, art. 2 [hereinafter External Audits 
Act].  Possessing assets of KRW 10 billion or more triggers an audit.  Id.  Outside audits must be done by 
certified accountants.  Id. 
185
  Banking Act, supra note 16, arts. 22, 23, and 23-2; Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, arts.15-
16. 
186
  Jin Kuk Lee, Criminal Implications of Compliance as a Preventive Mechanism of Corporate 
Crime, 21 K. CRIM. REV. 65 (2010); Seong-Ho Seo, et al., Review on Discussions on Establishing Internal 
Control System Within Corporations Pursuant to Japanese Corporations Law, 24 K. ENT. L. STUDY 173 
(2010); Jong-Mi Yoon, Study on the Internal Control System to Prevent Conflicts of Interest, 24 K. ENT. L. 
STUDY 217 (2010); Byungseok Jeong, For the Generalization of Compliance Systems on Korean 
Corporations, 26 K. COMM. L. STUDY 261 (2007). 
187
  Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 23-3; Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 28; Insurance 
Business Act, supra note 28, art. 17.  BYONG-JO MIN, ET AL, KOREA BANKING INSTITUTE, COMPLIANCE 
OFFICER, 207-225 (2009) (stating that internal education on compliance is conducted once or twice a year 
by most securities companies).   
188
  For example, qualifying factors for an insurance company’s compliance officer include:  ten years 
of finance working experience; five years of finance working experience with a master’s degree; or five 
years of experience as a lawyer, certified public accountant, actuary or public official.  Insurance Business 
Act, supra note 28, art. 17(4). 
189
  Id. art 17(5). 
JUNE 2011 KOREA FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKET 511 
  
or submit information or documents, and are responsible for monitoring 
compliance in order to report to the audit committee or standing auditor.190   
Unfortunately, this inside gatekeeper does not appear to be 
functioning.  The compliance officer system is still ineffective and 
perfunctory because the financial institutions are often managed by family 
members of the founder, not by professional managers. 191   The only 
remaining option to rectify the situation is to have the nominating committee 
dominated by non-standing directors who are independent of the controlling 
shareholders.192  In the end, financial institutions should work for the benefit 
of the investors—the public.193   
B. Internal Control System 
Another criterion for compliance is that financial institutions establish 
an internal control system as required.  Along with the compliance officer, 
an internal control system was also introduced to financial institutions in 
2000.  Its coverage is extremely broad to include the following controls for 
investment banking businesses:194  i) division of business and organizational 
structure; ii) risk management guidelines for operation of proprietary and 
investor assets; iii) standard operation procedure manual; iv) establishment 
of efficient management information delivery system for decision making; 
v) verification procedure for compliance and counter-measure procedure on 
violations; vi) procedure and standards to prevent unfair trades, including 
transaction reports; vii) procedure setting up internal control standards; viii) 
appointment procedure of compliance officer; xi) cognizance and 
management of conflicts; x) compliance procedure on voting rights 
regarding collective assets or trust assets; and xi) selection of brokers and 
                                           
190
  Id. art 17(6).  Article 17(8) also provides incentives for businesses to have effective compliance 
programs, such as the waiver of audits, the shortening of audits, or the reduction of sanctions. 
191
  E.g., Jong-Mi Yoon, supra note 186. 
192
  Currently, the board has the authority to appoint the compliance officer.  Insurance Business Act, 
supra note 28, art. 17(3). 
193
 If a company is operated by controlling shareholders, independent directors are desirable only for 
the protection of minority shareholders.  Thus, one can argue that reliance on a director’s fiduciary duty 
(with breaches remedied through litigation) would be more effective.  See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE 88 (17th ed. 2010) (noting there is no systematic evidence that independent directors do a better 
job at protecting minority shareholder rights than non-independent directors).  
194
  Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art. 31.  As for banks and insurance companies, see 
Enforcement Decree of the Banking Act, Presidential Decree No. 15651, Feb. 20, 1998, amended by 
Presidential Decree No. 21775, Oct. 29, 2009, art. 17(2) [hereinafter Banking Act E.D.]; Enforcement 
Decree of the Insurance Business Act, Presidential Decree No. 18093, Aug. 27, 2003, amended by 
Presidential Decree No. 21518, May 29, 2009, art. 22 [hereinafter Insurance Act E.D.]. 
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dealers for collective investment and trust assets. 195   The Financial 
Supervisory Services, 196  KOFIA, 197  and Bank of Korea 198  offer various 
standard forms and manuals. 
In 2003, the Korean government expanded the mandatory internal 
accounting control system to the companies subject to outside auditing,199 
which was modeled on Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United 
States. 200   Such a system must include: 1) cognizance, measurement, 
classification, recording, and reports of accounting information; 2) control of 
errors in accounting information and a rectification method; 3) periodic 
checks and reconciliation of accounting information; 4) management of 
books and records, with controls against falsification, modification, or 
distortion; and 5) division of responsibility among management for the 
production and disclosure of accounting information.201  A company’s board 
is required to adopt the system,202 which is to be disclosed to the public 
investors. 203   Under the system, the CEO shall designate one standing 
director as internal accounting system manager.204  The manager shall report 
to the audit committee or auditor annually on the company’s operational 
reality.205  The outside auditor for accounting matters is also required to 
report the status of the company to the board and attach its views to the 
annual audit report.206  The CEO and the officer for public disclosure matters 
are also required to certify that the company’s internal accounting control 
system complies with legal requirements. 207   The Financial Supervisory 
Services provided guidelines for a standard practice of internal accounting 
                                           
195
  Financial Investment Business Regulations, FSS Public Notice No. 2008-5, amended by FSS 
Public Notice No. 2010-30 (Sep. 1, 2010).  
196
  FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/bbs/list.jsp?bbsid=1207388738482 (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
197
  KOFIA, http://www.kofia.or.kr/kofia/index.cfm (last visited Apr.11, 2011). 
198
  BANK OF KOREA, http://dl.bok.or.kr/index.ax (last visited May 10, 2011). 
199
  See External Audits Act, supra note 184, art. 2(2).  Companies with assets of less than KRW 100 
billion are exempt.  
200
  15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2010). 
201
  Enforcement Decree of the Act on External Audits of Stock Companies, Presidential Decree No. 
12939, Mar. 3, 1990, amended by Presidential Decree No. 2493, Nov. 15, 2010, art. 2(2) [hereinafter 
External Audits Act E.D.].  Article 2(2) lists additional items to be covered by such a system: establishment 
and amendment procedures; compliance procedures of management in producing and disclosing accounting 
information; counter measures in response to a CEO who orders the production or disclosure of false 
accounting information in violation of the system, and censure procedure for officers who violate the 
system. 
202
  Id. art. 2(3)(1). 
203
  Id. art. 2(3)(3). 
204
  External Audits Act, supra note 184, art. 2(3). 
205
  Id. art. 2(4). 
206
  Id. arts. 2-3. 
207
  See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 119; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art. 
124. 
JUNE 2011 KOREA FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKET 513 
  
control systems in 2005, and subsequently provided two commentaries in 
2007.208 
It is not clear whether this legal requirement of an internal control 
system has helped reduce the possibility of accounting fraud.  As 
demonstrated by the fact that many accounting firms are still sanctioned by 
the Financial Services Commission for defective audits,209 this system does 
not appear to be airtight.210  
C. Whistleblower Protection 
The Capital Markets Act also has a special section for protection of 
whistleblowers.  Anyone who has found unlawful conduct under the Capital 
Markets Act, including the unfair trades listed in Book 4,211 or who has been 
urged to violate the Capital Markets Act, may report such facts to the 
Financial Services Commission. 212   The Financial Services Commission 
shall keep confidential the identity of the informer.213  The organization to 
which the informer belongs may not, directly or indirectly, discriminate 
against him or her.214  The informer, on the other hand, may be compensated 
by the Financial Services Commission up to KRW 100 million.215 
In practice, however, compensation has never been paid out.  Cases of 
unfair trading in capital markets involving inside informers seem to be 
extremely rare.  The Financial Supervisory Services investigated 166 new 
cases during the third quarter of 2010, of which 48 cases were initiated by 
the Financial Supervisory Services and 157 cases were intiated by KRX.  
This is in stark contrast with the United States, where employees and the 
media report a substantial portion of instances of corporate fraud.216 
                                           
208
  FSS, STANDARD PRACTICE (Jun. 23, 2005).  See also FSS, COMMENTARIES FOR SMALL AND 
MEDIUM COMPANIES (Jun. 2007); FSS, COMMENTARIES FOR LARGE COMPANIES (Dec. 2005), available at 
http://acct.fss.or.kr/acc/sub/page.jsp?pageNum=7&subNumber=1. 
209
  FSC, REVIEW OF FY 2010 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Jan. 14, 2011).  The sample review indicates 
more defective audits were noted in 2010 (38 of 217) than in 2009 (24 of 212).  Id. 
210
  As to the liability of officers and outside auditors to shareholders, see S. Ct., 
2006DA16758/16765, Oct. 25, 2007; S. Ct., 2007DA60080, Dec. 13, 2007; S. Ct., 2006DA19603, Nov. 30, 
2007.  
211
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16 (Book 4 addresses insider trading and unfair trading). 
212
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 435; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art. 384. 
213
  Id. art. 435(4). 
214
  Id. art. 435(5). 
215
  Press Release, FSS, 2010 Q3 Investigation Status Report (Oct. 28, 2010); see also Act on Anti-
Corruption and the Establishment and Operation of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, Act 
No. 8878, Feb. 29, 2008, amended by Act No. 9402, Feb. 3, 2009, arts. 62-71; External Audits Act, supra 
note 184, art. 15(3).  
216
  See I. J. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud, 38 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper 156/2007, 2007) (observing that in 
216 reported fraud cases in large United States companies between 1996 and 2004, 34.3% of reports came 




Discussion of theories of punishment, including expressivist—that is, 
the goal public condemnation—are beyond the scope of this article.  
However, it may be helpful to remember the unique characteristics of white-
collar crime, including misconduct in the financial services market, as 
distinguished from non-financial crimes.  As Darryl Brown has put it:  
Corporate and white-collar crime prosecution differs from street 
crime prosecution because of its different mix of retributive and 
deterrence concerns, which leads corporate crime policy to take 
greater advantage of our knowledge of how social norms 
interact with law, of the social costs that accompany 
punishment, and of the alternatives to criminal law. . . .  Our 
white-collar crime policy has a much better mix of regulatory 
strategies, civil remedies, and criminal sanctions.217   
The current financial services market in Korea is responsive to 
sanctions and deterrence.  However, the focus of enforcement efforts should 
move toward civil and preventive aspects of the policy tools because, in part, 
the regulatory target is much more complicated than situations that may be 
reduced to guilty or not guilty verdicts. 218   Furthermore, if criminal or 
administrative sanctions are imposed by less controlled, haphazard 
authorities, such sanctions become unpredictable.  This has damaged and 
will continue to damage the legitimacy of the law.   
A. Concern about Ineffective Sanctions and Due Process  
The current Korean legal structure for regulating the financial services 
market has incorporated most of the major enforcement mechanisms adopted 
in both civil law and common law jurisdictions.  It adopted criminal and 
administrative enforcement mechanisms administered by public authorities, 
which is a traditional approach in civil law jurisdictions.  Private 
enforcement based on strict liability and class action, an approach utilized in 
                                                                                                                              
from insiders); Geoffrey Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate 
and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007) (arguing § 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
not sufficient to protect whistleblowers, proposing bounty model). 
217
  Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 
U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1297-98 (2001).  But see Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and 
Theories of Punishment: A Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2002) (objecting to Brown’s 
theory of punishment).   
218
  This concept is not new.  See IN-SUB CHOI ET AL., K. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, THE CURRENT 
STATES OF FINANCIAL CRIME AND SOCIO-LEGAL COUNTERMEASURES IN KOREA (2002); YOUNG-MIN JANG 
ET AL., K. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, DIE BEKAEMPFUNG DER BOERSENKRIMINALITAET (1994). 
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the United States, is also available.  All the features of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, including requirements for a board with outside independent directors, 
an independent audit committee, whistleblower protection, and certification 
of the CEO and disclosure officer, are also incorporated in Korean law.219 
Although the current mechanism appears comprehensive and all-
inclusive, the reality is far from the purported aim of such legislative moves.  
The current system is not entirely effective in addressing crimes in the 
financial services market.  Violations of the laws seem significant across the 
board.220  The ongoing use of slush funds under borrowed names, stock price 
manipulation with corporate funds, and other unlawful behavior 221  by 
business leaders demonstrates the disregard for the law among the top 
business executives.  If top-notch business leaders behave this way, there is 
some indication that small and medium business managers can be much 
worse.  The statistics illustrate the situation of continuously increasing cases 
and disputes.222 
More than a few corporations appear to have secret funds that are not 
recorded on their books, but instead concealed by false names; this practice  
is a violation of accounting rules.223  Most related party transactions between 
financial institutions and controlling shareholders or their affiliates are, for 
the purpose of managing the entrusted funds from their clients, subject to 
strict regulations—some are prohibited, some are to be approved of or 
reported.224  It seems that companies are not fully complying with these 
regulations.225  Loans in excess of legal limits have been made to affiliates, 
and entrusted funds are invested in-group affiliates.226   Requirements of 
initial and continuous public disclosure in a timely and accurate manner are 
not infrequently disregarded.227  Registration statements are not accurate and 
                                           
219
  See supra Part IV.  The one significant difference is that Korean law requires only one half of the 
board as independent for large listed or financial companies, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a 
majority of independent directors. 
220
  There seems to be no way to substantiate this observation with accurate statistical data.  Refer to 
the continuous scandals involving the top business executives, supra notes 13-14.  
221
  See supra note 13 and accompanying text.   
222
  See Press Release, FSS, 2009 Dispute Statistics, supra note 149. 
223
  See, e.g., Press Release, FSC, Sanctions on Shinhan Bank for Violation of Real Name Financial 
Transactions System (Nov. 18, 2010).   
224
  See supra Table 6. 
225
  FSC, Meeting Minutes (Nov. 18, 2010) (discussing mutual savings and loan practices for project 
financing) available at http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/con_fscc_list.jsp.  
226
  Reviewing the sanctions of the FSC, these violations appear to be most frequent. 
227
  See, e.g., Press Release, FSC, Sanctions on Disclosure Requirements Violations (Nov. 24, 2010) 
(announcing SFC resolutions on violations from false statement of purposes for financing to failure to 
disclose major transactions).  The SFC meets almost every other week to adopt sanctions on disclosure 
violations.  For examples, visit Press Room, FCC, 
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_list.jsp?menu=7210100&bbsid=BBS0030 (search in “sanctions” box).  
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periodic disclosure documents contain false or misleading information.228  
Rumors are spread, and prices are manipulated.229   
Why do violations occur?230  It is true that some people will always 
commit crimes, as it is part of human nature.  However, a truism is not a 
sufficient explanation for financial market crimes, as they are linked to the 
fundamentals of the economic system that allocates and mediates financial 
resources.231  There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon.  
Some argue that sanctions are not grave enough to deter potential violators.  
This is true of some violations, 232 but not all.233  Others argue that violators 
easily avoid the loose network of investigations, and therefore the regulatory 
agencies should have broader investigatory authority.234   
This article argues that violations occur because the regulatory 
framework has not been accepted as establishing norms to be complied with 
by the players in the market.  When regulatory powers are centralized in 
certain governmental agencies and their power is largely discretionary, one 
tends to believe that the rules can be made inapplicable if one has the power 
to influence the agencies.  The public and the market players would not 
accept these kinds of rules as true norms that require observance.  To 
enhance compliance, therefore, the rules of the game should be clear so that 
players can understand what is prohibited and what is allowed.  Business 
people need to be educated about the rules to be observed, the odds of being 
caught, and the resulting severe hardship.  In addition, incentives can be 
used to facilitate compliance when appropriate. 235   Only when business 
                                           
228
  Press Releases, FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/nws/nbd/bodobbs_l.jsp?gubun=01 (search for 
“disclosure violations”).  One curious thing is why so few suits have been filed regarding Securities and 
Futures Commission sanctions. 
229
  E.g., Press Release, FSC, Sanctions on Unfair Trade Practices in Capital Market (Jan. 19, 2011) 
(announcing SFC resolutions on unfair trade practices from price manipulations to failure to report 5%).  At 
least the number of violations discovered by the authorities has been increasing.  See Securities and Unfair 
Trade Complaint Center, FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/scop/main.jsp (last visited April 28, 2011) (providing 
statistics on unfair trade practices in the capital market). 
230
  See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND RESOURCES 
FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 29-36 (2005) (listing theories of criminal motivations: Genetics; Greed; 
Intent to Benefit the Employer; Ignorance; JanValjean Theory; Master of the Universe; Bad to the Bone; 
and Milgram Effect). 
231
  FSC thus recently adopted policy directions to liberalize regulations for small and medium growth 
companies and venture companies despite the possible insidious corruptions at KOSDAQ.  See FSS, 
Development of KOSDAQ (Jan. 26, 2011). 
232
  See Criminal Act, supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
233
  Criminal sanctions for insider trading and price manipulation seem to be sometimes excessively 
harsh, especially the concept of price manipulation is not clear. 
234
  See Seoul C. Dist. Ct., 2010 KOHAP 11, Jan. 28, 2011. 
235
 A lack of a feeling of guilt is one of the general characteristics of corporate crimes, LEE CHEON-
HYUN, ET AL., K. INST.. OF CRIMINOLOGY, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS OF 
CORPORATIONS 28-29 (2009), thus incentives may increase compliance. 
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people think they should play the game following the rules, can these rules 
become norms.  
How can the Korean financial market become more advanced236 in the 
sense that all the players compete in accordance with the rules and any 
violators, if any, are found and punished?  Modeling on every prevalent 
current foreign law is to chase a phantom.  To improve the situation, the 
remedies should be coordinated and strategically focused, based on the 
particular business environment of Korea’s national economy.  This article 
addresses two concerns about the current situation:  1) after-the-fact 
sanctions may not be workable anymore; and 2) procedural safeguards 
against less-controlled discretionary practices should be established.  
Solutions for these concerns are discussed in the following section. 
B. Proposed Strategic Approaches to Enhance Compliance 
This article proposes four strategic approaches to enhance compliance 
in the Korean financial service market.  The first approach is to utilize 
incentives, including education.  By offering incentives to implement 
preventive compliance programs, Korean regulatory agencies can improve 
the efficacy of the regulatory system.  The preventive compliance programs 
should be intertwined with the enforcement mechanism.  The other three 
approaches are to formulate clearer rules and to find the right balance among 
various enforcement tools—between private and public and between 
criminal and administrative.  If too many different implementation measures 
and resources are devoted to stopping misconduct in the financial services 
market, this would lead to inefficient allocation of public capital.  Specific 
enforcement structures should be designed for different types of financial 
crimes.  Criminal sanctions should be limited to egregious violations and 
those in which damages are not easily calculated.  Administrative sanctions 
are effective when immediate responses are desirable and criminal 
conviction is not easy.  Private damage claims in the form of class action 
lawsuits should be more readily available to investors.  In this way, 
government agencies and private players in the market will reach their own 
objectives and relative positions within specific timelines.   
                                           
236
  Many factors may be used to measure the financial market in a specific venue.  The size of the 
market capitalization is an obvious choice.  The number of IPOs by foreign corporations can be another 
tenet of competitive markets.  Another measure is a review of market motivators, such as compliance costs 
and the resulting benefits of international financing, such as lower capital cost and bonding premium.  
Trustworthiness of the rules in the market is an important deciding factor.  See SCOTT, supra note 193, at 
48-55; COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, supra note 80. 
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1. Incentives of a Compliance Program 
As mentioned above, financial institutions are required to have a full-
time compliance officer as well as internal control and accounting 
systems.237  However, failure to meet such requirements leads to sanctions 
while vigorous execution of the requirements leads to no rewards. 238  
Rewards, however, incentivize stricter compliance with ex ante measures 
and would ultimately lead to fewer violations.  Such a compliance program 
should thus be considered in determining the legal liability of a company.  If 
companies have implemented compliance programs, sanctions regarding a 
violation should be mitigated. 
The Korean Court Organization Law was revised to require 
establishment of the Sentencing Commission on Apr. 27, 2007.239   The 
Sentencing Commission has vigorously built up the sentencing guidelines 
for several categories of crimes since then; by 2010, murder, bribery, sex 
crimes, embezzlement, and perjury were covered. 240   In line with the 
Sentencing Commission’s efforts, the Korean Ministry of Justice has been 
discussing the standards for arrests.241  As the Sentencing Commission and 
the Ministry of Justice make progress in refining and expanding guidelines 
for arrest and sentencing, 242 one factor to be considered is the compliance 
program of a corporate entity.  As discussed above, a corporate entity cannot 
be held responsible for its employees or agents without a finding of 
negligence in its supervision and operation. 243  Thus, compliance programs 
of a corporate entity must be reviewed in determining the existence of 
negligence on the corporate side.244  As civil fines on corporate entities also 
require a finding of negligence, the practice of a compliance program’s 
                                           
237
  See supra Part IV. 
238
  For example, no dual liability has been recognized by courts because of the due diligence and care 
over management and supervision of its employees. 
239
  Bupwonchojik beob [Court Organization Act], Act No. 3902, Dec. 4, 1987, amended by Act No. 
9940, Apr. 25, 2010, art. 81(2).  
240
  Meeting minutes of the Korean Sentencing Commission are available at KOREAN SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, http://sc.scourt.go.kr/sc/main/Main.work. 
241
  Press Release, Korean Ministry of Justice, International Symposium on Sentencing and Arrest 
(Dec. 11, 2009).   
242
  As of 2010, murder, bribery, sex crimes, burglary, embezzlement, perjury, and false accusations 
have been addressed. 
243
  See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 448 (requiring failure of due care for corporate 
criminal liability); Const. Ct., 2008 HUNGA10, Jul. 30, 2009 (holding unlimited dual penalty clauses 
unconstitutional). 
244
  See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  It is not clear whether no negligence is a defense from 
the corporate side or whether negligence should be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecutors.  
For an indication of similar options, see Kwan-Hoon Kwak, The Study on the Prevention of Corporate 
Crime in Corporate Law, 32 GANGWON L. REV. 163, 175-177 (2011). 
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requirements can operate as a defense.245  Depending on the level of in-
house compliance programs, the prosecuting authority should consider 
deferring the prosecution.   
Even once a corporate entity has been held responsible for the 
individual’s misconduct, compliance programs practice should be one of the 
factors the court considers when determining fines.  The current regulations 
require the size of civil fines be determined in accordance with a formula 
that is more detailed than that which determines the size of criminal fines.246  
The current regulations on unfair trading in the capital market provide for 
the possibility of a 20% reduction in fines if the financial institutions have 
operated consistent compliance programs.247  As such, as long as civil fines 
are concerned, compliance program practice offers a substantial incentive, 
although it is rarely applied.  This incentive should be expanded to the effect 
that the sanction itself, or selection of a sanction, would be decided 
considering a company’s compliance program practice.248  Like the case for 
an anti-trust compliance program, the Financial Services Commission can 
consider grading the compliance program to grant appropriate benefits to the 
higher-level compliance programs.249 
In incentivizing compliance, education in corporate life should be 
credited and supported.  Many contend that the driving force behind Korean 
economic development for the past several decades has been education.250  
“Education” in Korea often means achieving higher individual scores on 
entrance exams at high schools and colleges.  Education after graduation, 
however, is possible and desirable.  Continuing education will contribute to 
                                           
245
  Some scholars argue that the prosecutor should have the burden of proof in such a case.  See 
Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L.REV. 1319, 
1319-24 (2007). 
246
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 430; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art. 379; 
Reg. A&S, supra note 97. 
247
  Reg. A&S, supra note 97, schedule 2, item 5.C(4).  Cooperation with the investigatory authorities 
also would be considered.  Reg. A&S schedule 2, item 5.C(2) provides a 30% reduction for voluntary 
remedial measure while item 5.C(3) permits a 20% reduction in the case of voluntary reporting of 
violations.  As to the leniency measures initiated from antitrust enforcement by the Korea Free Trade 
Commission (“KFTC”), see Leniency System Operation Announcement, KFTC Public Notice No. 2005-7, 
amended by KFTC Public No. 2009-46 (Aug. 20, 2009).  However, not a single case has been found from 
FSC and SFC decisions on the amount of fines based on the compliance program.  See supra notes 134-35. 
248
  See Regulations on Case Management, supra note 133 (providing that KFTC may waive ab initio 
investigation, depending on the level of compliance programs). 
249
  See id. (providing for rules of grading compliance programs into eight groups).  As to the SEC 
practice, see Report of Investigation Pursuant to § 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange 
Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) (setting forth thirteen factors to consider in determining whether to 
credit self-policing, self-reporting and cooperation). 
250
  YUGUI GUO, ASIA'S EDUCATIONAL EDGE: CURRENT ACHIEVEMENTS IN JAPAN, KOREA, TAIWAN, 
CHINA, AND INDIA 75-118 (2005). 
520 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 3 
 
 
higher collective achievements of social goals such as legal compliance.  
Education programs for compliance should be developed and utilized by 
corporations.  It is true that KRX and KOFIA have been operating many 
seminars and education programs, and Korean law colleges and schools have 
done the same.251  However, not many compliance-related programs have 
been offered yet. 252   By requiring corporate entities to run education 
programs about compliance, Korea should finally be able to become a 
respected member of the global corporate world.253 
2. Clearer Rules 
Some argue that the principle-based regulation used in the United 
Kingdom provides a better alternative to the rules-based approach of the 
United States because the market always works better than regulations.254  
Many believe the United Kingdom’s more principle-based system makes the 
financial market more competitive.255  The argument preferring one to the 
other is not convincing.  Not only is the concept of principle-based 
regulation itself not clear,256 but law is always a combination of principles 
and rules.  Without principles, the full meaning of rules is hard to grasp.  
Without detailed rules, the full significance of principles is difficult to 
enforce.  They are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are complementary.  
Separating rules and principles would not help to frame the future regulatory 
framework for capital markets.   
                                           
251
  For example, Yonsei Law School offers compliance seminars to its students. 
252
  As to the curriculum of law schools in Korea, Young-Cheol Jeong, Korean Legal Education for 
the Age of Professionalism: Suggestions for More Concerted Curricula, 5 EAST ASIA L. REV. 155, 164-65 
(2010). 
253
  As an ex post facto measure, the KFTC can request the firm get educated.  See KFTC, Operating 
Manual on Corrective Measures, Nov. 1, 2005, amended on Aug. 12, 2009, art. VII.3(c). 
254
  For example, Professor Scott believes “[t]he United States clearly seems to be more enforcement-
oriented, through the use of actions, than its capital market competitors, and this may be partially 
responsible for its loss of competitiveness.”  SCOTT, supra note 193, at 156.  He is also critical of the fact 
that the SEC as an agency is dominated by lawyers and that economists play a marginal role in the 
formulation of regulation or enforcement policy, suggesting the SEC use cost-benefit analysis in 
connection with its proposals.  Id.; see also Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006); 
Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation (European Corporate Governance 
Institute, Working Paper 21/2004, Apr. 2004) (supporting disclosure and whistleblower enforcement 
mechanisms as the least costly options). 
255
  See Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, Making a Success of Principles-Based 
Regulation, 1 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 191 (2007); PAUL NELSON, CAPITAL MARKETS LAW AND COMPLIANCE 
19-53 (2008). 
256
  See Lawrence Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principle-Based System in 
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007). 
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In terms of relative weight, Korea needs more rules because too many 
rule-making functions have been delegated to the executive branch over the 
past several decades, in the name of efficiency.  As Korea needs to make law 
based on political consensus and a more democratic process, the legislators 
need more training and time.  Nonetheless, no policy or statute can be 
enforceable based on skeleton authorization from the legislative branch and 
enforcement from the executive branch.  The statutes should be more 
focused on rules as a legitimate check to executive discretion.  Unclear rules 
lead citizens to turn to political influence instead of trying to comply with 
rules, a dynamic that politicians and decision-makers seem to want to 
maintain.  Korea needs rules that are more detailed, not more principles.257 
One of the most persuasive arguments for broad executive authority in 
regards to the financial market is that the market is volatile and policy 
responses should be prompt.  In terms of quantity, this might be true.  
However, there are many ways for regulatory agencies to respond to the 
market.  Civil culture and legitimacy of law are the core values of 
compliance with law, and thus formulation of principles and rules should be 
reserved for the legislative branch.  This is why the former Korean Ministry 
of Finance used to regulate the corporate finance of listed companies under 
the Securities and Exchanges Act before the Capital Markets Act entered 
into effect on February 4, 2009.  After most sections were reassigned to the 
Korean Commercial Code,258 the Korean capital market functioned without 
any serious crises.  The actual market situation over the past few years is a 
demonstration that rules can and should regulate the capital market. 
Concerns over democratic legitimacy, however, are not necessarily of 
the utmost importance.  More important is the inefficiency of the system 
stemming from the delegation of rulemaking to the executive branch.  As 
Korean society is significantly diverse and complicated, unilateral 
rulemaking from the executive branch can no longer operate as a means of 
reaching consensus.  It is true that legislative lawmaking competency could 
be improved.  That, however, does not mean it is desirable that Korea 
statutes and rules should be formulated and processed interminably by the 
executive branch.  As the National Assembly of Korea has been 
institutionalizing the Research Service and Budget Office 259  to assist its 
legislative activities, it needs more work and responsibilities. 
                                           
257
  MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, PROJECT REPORT ON DELEGATED LEGISLATION, 
available at http://www.moleg.go.kr/knowledge. 
258
  But see Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 165(2)-(18) (providing for listed companies). 
259
  See NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.nars.go.kr (last visited Apr. 29, 2011); 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.nabo.go.kr/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2011). 
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3. Balance between Public and Private Enforcement 
Public and private enforcement mechanisms have much room for 
improvement,260 and the right balance should be struck between the two 
enforcement avenues.  The balance between ex post facto measures and ex 
ante programs should also be parsed.  Under the Korean Constitution, public 
powers may intrude into private domains, including the self-sufficient 
market, for limited purposes and pursuant to specific processes and explicit 
authorization.  Hence, public capital should be used according to the 
priorities of the model’s assumptions and maxims.  Such expenditures, thus, 
are to be allocated depending on the severity of financial crimes and the 
efficacy of such spending, among other things.261  Such allocation is, in 
reality, the outcome of political process.   
Figure 1, below, shows the overall enforcement mechanism and 
ensuing resource allocation depending on the severity of violations and 
efficacy of public spending.  While the current flow of public resources in 
the diagram runs from left to right, this article argues the more desirable 
direction of the flow should be from right to left because the efficacy of 
diverse enforcement tools also runs from right to left. 
 
 
[FIGURE 1]  PRIORITY OF DIVERSE ENFORCEMENT TOOLS 
 
The starting point for change is to provide opportunities for a remedy 
to private entities, except in cases of violations of moral principles. 262  
                                           
260
  See supra Part III. 
261
  See infra Figure 1. 
262
  One may argue that all financial crimes are just from greed and thus not a violation of moral 
principles.  However, certain crimes that are equivalent to fraud are related to moral principles, such as 
insider trading, addressed by the Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 174. 
Criminal Administrative 
Ex post facto Ex ante 
Public Private 
Priority of public capital allocation 
Severity of financial crimes/efficacy of expenditure/political process 
 
Ideal flow of resources Current flow of resources 
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Regardless of whether sanctions are from the court in response to the public 
prosecutor’s indictment, or from the Financial Services Commission as a 
result of its investigation, their basic aim is to impose hardship on the 
violators for their past misconduct, and thus to minimize future violations by 
the violator and others.  Deterrence is one of the major reasons for sanctions.  
Even so, the deterrent effect has proved to be limited at best,263 and thus the 
basic approach to sanctions should be to minimize them.  Misconduct in the 
financial market is not always frivolous, but in most cases it is technical 
(except fraud), making these kinds of violations more suitable for private 
entities to handle.  On the other hand, criminal sanctions should be limited to 
the cases in which the social impact is enormous.264  In cases where the 
damages are not easily calculable, public sanctions should be taken more 
seriously.   
One way to measure the balancing point between public and private 
enforcement mechanisms is cost-benefit analysis.  The financial services 
industry in Korea accounted for 6.3% of the 2009 GDP.  In terms of 
employment, it accounts for approximately 3.5% of the total employment.265  
If official costs of enforcement are the sum of the Financial Services 
Commission and the Financial Supervisory Services budgets, 266  they 
comprise 1.6% of the government spending. 267   If official costs of 
enforcement, benchmarked to GDP, are calculated, about $47,000 per billion 
dollars of GDP were spent on regulatory costs for the financial services 
industry in 2010.268  If Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation’s269 budget and 
                                           
263
  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
264
  See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; see also GAIL PEARSON, FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW 
AND COMPLIANCE IN AUSTRALIA 502 (2009) (“[C]riminal penalties are viewed by regulators as a matter of 
last resort, particularly as they take up significant resources and [the] criminal standard of culpability . . . is 
harder to prove.”). 
265
  Economic Status System, BANK OF KOREA, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2011). 
Year Financial services  
(KRW in billions) 
GDP Total Employees 
(in thousands) 
Financial services 
2005 53,394.8 865,240.9 n/a n/a 
2006 55,234.7 908,743.8 23,151 786 
2007 61,114.0 975,013.0 23,433 806 
2008 65,132.2 1,026,451.8 23,577 821 
2009 66,283.3 1,063,059.1 23,506 766 
 
266
  The firms’ compliance costs also should be part of the total cost weighed against the benefits. 
267
  MINISTRY OF STRATEGY AND FINANCE, http://www.mosf.go.kr/_lib/lib02/lib02index.jsp (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2011). 
2009 (KRW millions) Total budget:  199,875,979  FSC:  2,883,772 FSS:  246.4 
 
268
  FSS is substantially financed by financial institutions’ contribution.  See Financial Services 
Commission Act, supra note 39, art. 47.  Official costs of enforcement, of course, can be expanded to 
include the budgets of both the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (“KDIC”), see infra note 269, and the 
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Korea Asset Management Corporation’s270 liabilities are counted as part of 
the enforcement costs, it would go up to almost $90,000 per billion 
dollars.271  Compared to the figures in the United Kingdom and the United 
States272 in terms of the ratio of the enforcement cost to the size of the 
financial market, Korea seems to be at high end.  As such, private 
enforcement is the logical alternative to be encouraged.   
This does not mean Korean public officials are corrupt, captured by 
the industry, or insufficiently trained.  The argument for private enforcement 
does not stem from concerns about politically biased actions from public 
authorities.  Korean bureaucracy seems to have been mostly competent and 
mostly apolitical.  The argument also does not deny the possibility that 
private enforcement will be abused.  It appears true in many cases that 
private enforcement actions are initiated on the back of factual records 
created by public authorities.  Factual investigation and corresponding 
policy formation will remain largely with the public enforcement agencies.  
However, as the size and complexity of the Korean economy expands, the 
coverage of the bureaucracy should be decreased.  Private enforcement 
mechanisms would be able to supplement public efforts proportionally as the 
financial services industry grows.  Therefore, the right balancing point 
between public and private enforcement should move towards the private 
enforcement side. 
More specifically, the current class action system would have to be 
liberalized to the effect that small investors may access legal representation 
in calling for compensatory damages.273  As discussed above, the Securities 
and Futures Commission ordered civil money penalties relating to ten cases 
of disclosure violations in the fiscal year of 2009-2010.274  Without the 
private enforcement possibility, however, the current scale of civil fines 
                                                                                                                              
Korea Asset Management Corporation (“KAMCO”), see infra note 270, as well as other government think-
tank costs. 
269
  For 2010, the annual budget of the KDIC was KRW 178 billion.  Financial Status, KDIC, 
https://www.kdic.or.kr/introduce/estimate.jsp (last visited May 11, 2011).  KDIC is similar to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation in the United States. 
270
  For 2009, the liability of KAMCO was KRW 2.45 trillion.  Financial Statements, KAMCO, 
http://www.kamco.or.kr/home/man/04_03.jsp (last visited May 11, 2011).  KAMCO handles all sorts of 
bad assets on behalf of diverse financial institutions. 
271
  John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 260 
(2007) ("Only South Korea . . . approaches the GDP-adjusted expenditures of the common law countries."). 
272
  The total regulatory expenditure per billion of GDP in 2004 was $425,804 in the United States and 
$276,655 in the United Kingdom.  Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: 
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 268-69 (2007).  Prof. Jackson’s 
United States figure includes FDIC budgets.  The cost for 2010 would be substantial. 
273
  One possibility is to expand the coverage of the Securities Class Action Act to breaches of the 
Capital Markets Act.  Restrictions on legal representation also should be obviated. 
274
  FSS, Sanctions on Disclosure Violations, supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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would not be a deterrent, considering the certainty of public enforcement.  
The most probable reason for the lack of private legal action seems to be 
limited access to legal remedies for small investors.  Accessibility could also 
be improved by increasing the number of professional lawyers who are free 
from the captured interest of conglomerates, which dominate the economic 
scene in Korea.  To reach critical mass for legal representation, especially for 
class action suits, attorneys should be readily available for all causes of 
action.  
Many criticisms may be raised under the current mode of regulations 
in Korea.  It may be true that some extra additional maneuvering by the 
government is possible.  However, one cannot expect that government 
authorities can do everything.  Furthermore, the government cannot be held 
responsible for everything.  Except for certain types of misconduct in the 
financial services market where damages are not easily calculated, 
expansion of class actions appears to be the most realistic and least intrusive 
option to compensate mistreated investors. 
4. Balance between Criminal and Administrative Sanctions 
Based on the modern nation-state model, minimization of criminal 
conduct is the first principle.  The second principle is that criminal penalties 
should be proportionate to the crimes.  The third principle is that all powers 
should be institutionalized and systemized in order to be controllable.  These 
are also the legal foundations of the mandate of government power, 
including prosecutorial authority.  Even from a policy point of view, a 
prosecutor without principles has no legitimacy, and thus would quickly lose 
the confidence of the public.  Without institutional trust from the public, no 
public agency could survive.  If law enforcement institutions are ineffective, 
more crimes will occur. 275  Fewer resources would then be available, which 
would in turn lead to more crimes.276  This is a typical vicious circle at 
institutional levels. 
The financial services market plays a pivotal role of distributing 
limited financial resources within a society.277  It is a nerve center of the 
economic system.  However, that does not mean violations in the financial 
                                           
275
  See Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1272, 1280 (1991) 
(“[A]n individual has a higher current propensity for crime if fewer resources were spent on the criminal 
apprehension system during a past period of his active life.  Fewer resources dilute the resources spent on 
apprehending each criminal.”). 
276
  See id. 
277
  S. Ct., 2000DA9086, Mar. 15, 2002 (acknowledging special functions of banks, the Court directed 
that stricter fiduciary duty be imposed on management). 
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market should be penalized.  Nor does it mean that corporate entities should 
be fined in addition to individuals.  As explained above, though, the current 
situation is dreadful.278  Every violation of the applicable laws involving the 
financial market is subject to severe criminal sanctions.  Corporate entities 
are subject to dual penalties.  Only the public prosecutor has the 
monopolistic power to file an indictment.  No failed prosecution is checked 
by outsiders.  Additionally, public prosecutors lack the investigatory 
expertise or instruments for financial market crimes.  Thus, public 
prosecutors should narrow their jurisdiction over criminal conduct, which in 
turn would advance the efficiency of criminal sanctions.   
The Ministry of Justice should revisit the scope of crimes under the 
foregoing tripartite statutes on financial markets.  After narrowing the reach 
of criminal sanctions, the severity of the punishment should be increased so 
that it is measured proportionate to the crimes.  Finally, the Ministry of 
Justice should develop a control mechanism to prevent illegitimate 
discretion.  It should seriously consider developing guidelines and criteria to 
measure its discretionary power in writing.279  Guidelines might have to be 
memorialized in writing as opposed to hierarchical approval procedures.  
The Internal Audit Committee and the Prosecution Citizens Committee 
should be more active.280 
Compared to the Ministry of Justice, the Financial Services 
Commission has developed more detailed rules to calculate the amount of 
civil fines.  To make them more effective, however, the amount of civil fines 
should increase substantially.281  The capital market cannot be developed by 
applying loose rules to the issuers of securities.  Rather, the regulator’s 
policy goals should be to protect investors.  In the case of price cartels, the 
fine is based on the gross sales revenue during the collusion.  It is not limited 
to unusual gains from the collusion.  Likewise, the size of a fine does not 
have to be capped at KRW 2 billion.282  To make administrative sanctions 
more certain, the Financial Services Commission should have extensive 
power to investigate the players in the market.  The Financial Services 
Commission should develop formal procedures for hearings and other fact-
gathering methods283 in order to fully develop due process.  At the same 
                                           
278
  See supra Part III.A.  
279
  See supra Part III.A.1.  
280
  See KOREA MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 2011 BUSINESS PLAN 14, available at http://www.moj.go.kr. 
281
  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
282
  Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 429 (lesser of sales or 2 billion for distribution in the 
primary market), 2 (lesser of 3/100 or 2 billion for tender offer) and 3 (lesser of 10/100 of daily trading or 2 
billion);. see also id. art. 428 (limiting 20/100 of the violated amounts). 
283
  Reg. Inv, supra note 97; Reg. A&S, supra note 97. 
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time, the procedural protection of individuals as well as firms should be 
clarified in writing.  In sum, the balance between criminal and administrative 
sanctions should move towards administrative sanctions with due process 
safety mechanisms firmly in place.284  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Phenomenally, Korea has built an industrial complex from green 
fields over the past several decades.  The size of the financial market in 
Korea is already substantial, 285  and it no longer stands alone, but is 
connected to international financial markets.286  The current enforcement 
system is full of gestures and postures, ultimately creating nothing but a 
facade.  Enforcement mechanisms, however, should not only be part of the 
code, but also function within the system.  Now Korea must develop the 
financial intermediaries and ensure the framework is efficiently constructed.   
Korea’s regulatory framework should shift from backward-looking to 
forward-leaning.  Threats of sanctions for past conduct are not a sufficient 
deterrent, and compliance should be considered to determine criminal and 
administrative liability.  Education, which made Korean economic 
development possible, is a critical component to operate an effective 
compliance program.  The magnitude of sanctions is not sufficient.  The lack 
of certainty in sanctions cannot be ignored considering the size and 
interconnection of the financial services market in Korea.  The rules must 
become clearer. 
Discussion about the most desirable regulatory structures for the 
financial services market in Korea is important.  Two increasingly important 
topics are how to establish an effective regulatory scheme and how to 
maximize efficacy and procedural and distributive justice within the system.  
By adopting the systemic and comprehensive approaches proposed in this 
article, Korea can formulate more enticing mechanisms to encourage market 
players to implement best practices as part of their business practices.  
                                           
284
  For the same line of arguments in the United States, see Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance 
Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM CRIM. L. 
REV. 1459 (2009). 
285
  See supra Table 1. 
286
  See Distribution of Shareholding by Owner, KRX, 
http://www.krx.co.kr/m2/m2_5/m2_5_6/m2_5_6_2/JHPKOR02005_06_02.jsp (showing foreign investors’ 
ownership ratio for the past several years in terms of market price). 
2009 30.44% 
2008 27.25% 
2007 30.94% 
2006 35.16 
 
